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In this dissertation, I introduce three algorithms, which are connectivity recon-
struction game (CRG), adaptive sector coloring game (ASCG), and asymmetric trans-
mission game (ATG), by mainly using supermodular game and exact potential game
with considerations of various objectives (e.g., energy consumption and interference
management) in wireless sensor and cellular networks. My main contributions are
threefold: 1) connectivity relaxation (energy saving) in wireless localization; 2) inter-
cell interference coordination in wireless cellular networks; 3) interference minimiza-
tion in wireless ad-hoc relay networks. The corresponding explanations are as follows.
1) In geographically dense and energy limited wireless sensor networks, connec-
tivity based localization with full power transmission can be inefficient in terms of
energy consumption. In this work, I propose a distributed power control based connec-
tivity reconstruction game, which takes into considerations of both energy efficiency
and the quality of localization. The proposed scheme results in a better performance
with an improved 61.9% reduction in energy consumption while maintaining the per-
formance of localization at a level similar to the conventional algorithm with full power
transmission.
2) Inter-cell interference coordination (ICIC) is a promising technique to improve
the performance of frequency-domain packet scheduling (FDPS) in downlink LTE/LTE-
A networks. However, it is difficult to maximize the performance of FDPS using static
ICIC schemes because of insufficient consideration of signal-to-interference-and-noise
ratio (SINR) distribution and user fairness. On the other hand, dynamic ICIC schemes
based on channel state information (CSI) also have difficulty presented in the excessive
signaling overhead and X2 interface latency. In order to overcome these drawbacks, I
introduce a new concept of ICIC problem based on geometric network information
(GNI) and propose an ASCG as a decentralized solution of the GNI based ICIC prob-
i
lem. Furthermore, I develop an ASCG with a dominant strategy space noted as ASCG-
D to secure a stable solution through proving the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE).
The proposed scheme provides better performance in terms of system throughput gain
of up to about 44.1%, and especially of up to about 221% for the worst 10% users
than static ICIC schemes. Moreover, the performance of the CSI based ICIC, which
require too much computational load and signaling overhead, is only 13.0% and 5.6%
higher than that of ASCG-D regarding the total user throughput and the worst 10% user
throughput, respectively. The most interesting outcome is that the signaling overhead
of ASCG-D is 1/144 of dynamic ICIC schemes’ one.
3) In this work, I introduce the new concept of temporal diversity utilization based
on asymmetric transmission to minimize network interference in wireless ad-hoc net-
works with a two-hop half-duplex relaying (HDR) protocol. Asymmetric transmis-
sion is an interference-aware backoff technique, in which each communication ses-
sion (source-relay-destination link) adaptively chooses a certain subset of spectrally-
orthogonal data streaming which should be delayed by the duration of one time-slot
(i.e., half of one subframe). I design the problem in the HDR scenario by applying
the concept of asymmetric transmission, and evaluate the game-theoretical algorithm,
called ATG, to derive the suboptimal solution. I show that ATG is an exact potential
game, and derive its convergence and optimality properties. Furthermore, I develop an
approximated version of ATG (termed A-ATG) in order to reduce signaling and com-
putational complexity. Numerical results verify that two algorithms proposed show
significant synergistic effects when collaborating with the conventional methods in
terms of interference coordination. Ultimately, the energy consumption to satisfy the
rate requirement is reduced by up to 17.4% compared to the conventional schemes
alone.
ii
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As game theory can reflect to various phenomenons in real world, game theoretical ap-
proach is widely and deeply used in economics, political science, psychology, and even
gambling. Fortunately, game theory can also provide stable and suboptimal solutions
by distributed manner in wireless networks, because the construction of game can be
suitably applied to those of various scenarios in wireless networks. As interest in de-
centralized wireless networks grew, game theoretic approaches to help us understand
and predict the performance of complex wireless systems that cannot be completely
modeled using traditional optimization tools. More concretely, the behavior of a given
wireless device may affect the communication capabilities of a neighboring device,
notably because the radio communication channel or the dedicated transmission time
is usually shared in wireless networks. In addition, as energy consumption become
capable of more sophisticated adaptations, the assumptions of game theoretic models
become a still better match for future wireless networks. With these considerations,
in this dissertation, I use two well-known games, which are supermodular game [1]
and exact potential game [2], for achieving various objectives in wireless networks.
The corresponding motivation, related work, and contribution of each of my works are
introduced in the following three sections.
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1.1 Application of Supermodular Game for Connectivity Re-
laxation in Wireless Localization
Localization in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is crucial to establish self-configuration
for surveillance, navigation, and communications. In WSN composed by small and
cheap nodes, localization by measuring received-signal-strength (RSS) and determin-
ing connectivity has become popular because of the low complexity and low cost of
sensor devices [3–6]. Among wireless localization techniques using RSS and con-
nectivity, the distributed weighted multidimensional scaling (dw-MDS) algorithm is
a well-known method that reduces computational complexity and localization error
compared to the classical multidimensional scaling (MDS) algorithm [7] based on all
pairwise distance measurements of sensors. The dw-MDS utilizes distance measure-
ments in one-hop coverage and iteratively solves the scaling by majorizing a compli-
cated function (SMACOF) algorithm based on the weighted cost function related that
allows distance measurements that are believed to be more accurate to be weighted
more heavily; consequently, dw-MDS outperforms the classical MDS in terms of lo-
calization error in spite of its distributed manner [8].
Because of the benefits of dw-MDS, it is used to develop several algorithms to
optimize the quality of localization [8–10]. However, most of these studies on the
wireless localization schemes have overlooked the amount of energy consumed in the
excessively high density of network connection among wireless nodes. In dw-MDS,
each node searches the neighboring nodes to exchange information for localization by
full or heuristically regulated transmission power. Even if quality of localization could
be guaranteed, these ambiguous power allocation are inefficient in a dense and energy-
limited WSN. A suitable approach for localization that optimizes network connectivity
in WSN is necessary.
To deal with the above considerations, I formulate the connectivity reconstruction
game (CRG) based on distributed power control as a solution for energy-efficient op-
2
timization in WSN localization.1 Furthermore, I show that the CRG satisfies the con-
ditions of supermodular game; consequently, I am able to characterize convergence
using the properties of supermodular game [1]. Simulation results show that dw-MDS
combined with CRG significantly reduces energy consumption when compared to dw-
MDS alone, while maintaining the performance of localization at a similar level.
1.2 Application of Exact Potential Game for Effective Inter-
Cell Interference Coordination in Wireless Cellular Net-
works
Orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) is the envisioned air in-
terface selected by the Third-Generation Partnership Project Long-Term Evolution
(3GPP LTE) standard on account of its high spectrum efficiency. In OFDMA-based
systems, the system bandwidth is divided into small radio resources known as resource
blocks (RBs), and it is the smallest packet scheduling unit in LTE and LTE-Advanced
(LTE-A) architectures [13, 14, 73]. The performance of downlink packet scheduling
in OFDMA-based systems is considerably influenced by the spatial and temporal
effectiveness of RB utilization. In RB utilization for downlink packet scheduling,
frequency-domain packet scheduling (FDPS) is well known as the optimal solution
to achieve the high system throughput and user fairness [16–19]. The FDPS is an
extended version of proportional fairness scheduling (PFS) such as two-dimensional
(2-D) packet scheduling in consideration of mapping between the RB domain and the
user domain.
Further, the performance of FDPS depends on how the feasible FDPS space is
coordinated well by a temporally and spatially suitable RB clusterings. The feasible
1In the previous works of [11] and [12], they also have the intuition related to energy saving for
localization. However, they focus on localizing sensor nodes based on cooperation among sets of anchor
nodes; thus, they are inappropriate to be applied to connectivity based localization.
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FDPS space based RB clustering determines the current state of signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) distribution and multiuser diversity gain, which have a strong
impact on the performance of FDPS. A kind of scheme developed to construct the
feasible FDPS space to achieve the increased FDPS performance is called inter-cell
interference coordination (ICIC)2 [20–39].
The ICIC has been investigated as an approach to alleviate the impact of inter-
ference in the OFDMA-based systems. Conventional ICIC schemes are categorized,
according to the update period for the current feasible FDPS space, into static ICIC
schemes and dynamic ICIC schemes [20]. Static ICIC schemes are frequency reuse-
based schemes and include the reuse-1, reuse-3, and partial frequency reuse (PFR)
schemes [21–25]. These are predetermined frequency reuse patterns, because they do
not require additional signaling overhead and system computational load. However,
they are inappropriate for use with different cell layouts with the existence of dynamic
network conditions such as the geometric user distribution and fast fading channel
condition. In realistic systems, the network conditions may have significant variations
over time. Symmetric and apriori frequency reuse patterns are highly inefficient in
time-varying network conditions.
Various dynamic ICIC schemes to overcome these drawbacks have recently at-
tracted research interest [26–39]. These dynamic ICIC schemes have emerged as ef-
ficient solutions to cope with changes in dynamic network conditions. Dynamic ICIC
schemes are also called cell coordination-based schemes. Dynamic ICIC schemes can
be categorized, based on the form of coordination and the level of optimizing ICIC,
into centralized schemes, semi-distributed schemes, coordinated-distributed schemes,
and autonomous-distributed schemes. In [20], the authors concretely introduce these
four levels of classification of dynamic ICIC schemes. In centralized schemes, a radio
2Coordinated multi-point (CoMP) transmission is another attractive radio access technique in an LTE-
A architecture. However, it incurs larger signaling overhead than ICIC schemes owing to the exchange of
users’ data as well as channel state information (CSI). In this study, I focus on ICIC rather than on CoMP.
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network controller (RNC) collects all of the CSI of every user in the network and op-
timizes the feasible FDPS space of every cell. This process naturally yields extreme
computational load because of a large number of potential solutions [26]. Even though
semi-distributed schemes, in which each evolved Node-B (eNB) relieves the computa-
tional load of RNC, the corresponding computational load is still high to optimize ICIC
properly in practical systems [30]. On the other hand, emerging cellular networks such
as LTE-A systems rely on inter-eNB connections over the X2 interface without any
central coordinator in a flat architecture [13]. LTE-A architectures solve the problem
of constructing the feasible FDPS space by using a coordinated-distributed scheme by
the exchange of CSI among eNBs, and not in a centralized or semi-distributed method
as done by an RNC. In coordinated-distributed schemes, the decision of ICIC is made
only at the eNB level. Thus, they are more attractive for practical implementation by
virtue of reducing the network infrastructure complexity to eliminate the central entity.
However, most of these studies on the coordinated-distributed schemes for the CSI
based ICIC have overlooked the temporal consideration of the signaling latency and
signaling overhead. Latency on the X2 interface is a particularly critical factor for sat-
isfying the performance requirements in LTE-A systems. Generally, the X2 interface
latency in an LTE-A system is approximately on the order of several tens of millisec-
onds [41–43]; therefore, it is difficult to implement coordinated-distributed schemes in
fast fading environments, such as those with a CSI coherence time of3 1-2 ms. Even af-
ter the message for CSI including information of inter-cell interference has been trans-
mitted, it could be useless since the channel conditions have already changed. This
contradiction has been overlooked in several studies on the CSI based ICIC [30–35].
Moreover, extremely large signaling overhead is necessary for exchanging global CSI.
The exchange of global CSI for ICIC is not acceptable for large networks because the
total feedback signaling overhead for ICIC increases exponentially due to the combi-
3After recognizing the need for resolving this temporal contradiction, LTE-A working groups have
been actively conducting research toward minimizing the latencies across the X2 interface.
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natorial nature of users. The signaling overhead must be reduced, which in turn may
degrade the overall performance of the system.4
Considering the above background, I introduce a new concept of the ICIC problem
based on geometric network information (GNI), which is the alternative to CSI. To de-
velop the well-constructed coordinated-distributed ICIC scheme for realistic systems,
a new ICIC problem with a long consistent period has to be established. The feasibility
of GNI based ICIC problem comes from the fact that the GNI is changed much slower
than the CSI. Based on this time-correlation property, the temporal limitations related
to the X2 interface latency and signaling overhead can be solved. I define the new
concepts of potential gain and suffered/suffering interference to formulate GNI based
utility function effectively. These new concepts are formulated by the correlation be-
tween the GNI and the current state of RB clustering at network-level. The interesting
outcome from this approach is that the signaling overhead of GNI based ICIC are much
smaller than that of CSI based ICIC. However, it is a rather complex task to search a
global optimal GNI based ICIC solution at the network level. Consequently, I propose a
game-theoretic coordinated-distributed scheme denoted as an adaptive sector coloring
game (ASCG) in order to resolve the GNI based ICIC problem with the reduced com-
putational load. Game theory provides analytical tools for predicting the outcome of
complicated interactions between rational entities. Game theoretic mechanism adapted
to GNI based ICIC problems is designed as follows: each eNB determines a feasible
FDPS space to maximize its own utility function of the GNI based ICIC problem, and
the decision is made only at eNB level5. This game-theoretic approach can be effec-
4Even though autonomous-distributed schemes can significantly reduce the computational load and
message exchange among eNBs, these schemes may bring other problems related to SINR distribution
and system throughput due to the absence of sharing ICIC strategies among eNBs. Thus, similar to static
ICIC schemes, autonomous-distributed schemes are also inappropriate for use with extremely irregular
and dynamic networks.
5Because the mechanisms of non-cooperative games and coordinated-distributed schemes for ICIC
are naturally similar, several studies on the use of game theoretic approaches, especially potential games,
for the CSI based ICIC in LTE-A are presently underway [36–38]. However, they also have the temporal
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tive implementation to obtain a suboptimal solution of the GNI based ICIC problem.
The name “ASCG” is based on the concept of an adaptive mapping between RBs and
beams (i.e., sectors), which appears similar to the action of the eNB coloring its sec-
tors. In ASCG, a set of players is eNBs in the entire network. During their turn to
update the strategy, all players myopically choose the best feasible FDPS space with
the fixed strategies of other players. Moreover, convergence to equilibrium is assured
by the conversion of ASCG to the form of an exact potential game [2], which is de-
noted as ASCG with dominant strategy space (ASCG-D). These new game theoretic
approaches are expected to be capable of finding a meaningful solutions compared to
conventional CSI based ICIC over the X2 interface.
My main contributions in this study can be summarized as follows: i) the formula-
tion of GNI based ICIC problem with low signaling overhead and insensitivity to the
X2 interface latency, ii) the construction of ASCG as the suboptimal solution of the
GNI problem with low complexity, iii) the development of ASCG to ASCG-D with
assurance of the stable solution.
1.3 Application of Exact Potential Game for Interference Min-
imization in Wireless Ad-hoc Relay Networks
The interest in energy efficiency in wireless networks has been increasing in recent
years. Energy-constrained wireless systems, such as device-to-device (D2D) commu-
nication [45, 46] and WSNs [47, 48], are composed of mobile devices typically pow-
ered by lifetime-limited batteries, which inconvenience the serviced users in practice.
In addition, the congestion by a large number of users sharing the same wireless re-
source would generate significant network interference among users, and therefore
aggravate the energy efficiency issue at the system level. The fundamental challenge
to utilize scarce energy efficiently in wireless systems is how to suppress network
limitation owing to the X2 interface latency.
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interference by well coordinating temporally and spectrally suitable schemes. The
amount of network interference is strongly tied to power consumption satisfying the
rate requirements of end-users, therefore, well-coordinated network interference man-
agement methods are necessary for extending the network lifetime. Furthermore, es-
pecially in an ad-hoc network that creates multi-hop links with a relaying protocol,
which is widely utilized in D2D communication and WSNs by virtue of its advantages
in extending communication coverage [49], improving spectral efficiency [50], and
reducing outage probability [51], it is not easy to optimize network interference re-
duction. The addition of a relaying protocol naturally makes interference coordination
more difficult because the interference links are more complex compared to ad-hoc
networks consisting of one-hop links.
To resolve the problems related to interference coordination and energy efficiency
in wireless ad-hoc relay networks, various approaches for algorithmic solutions, which
are categorized into relay selection, subchannel allocation (SA), and power alloca-
tion, have been developed [39, 40, 52–64]. First, considering that the network inter-
ference from relays to another destination is jointly affected by the relay selection
of all source-and-destination pairs, many interference-aware relay selection schemes
based on centralized or decentralized methods have been proposed for two-hop re-
lay networks to minimize the network interference in various scenarios [52–56]. Af-
ter the operation of the relay selection is carried out according to the network inter-
ference status (i.e., each of the proper communication sessions, which remains as a
source-destination link or is converted to source-relay-destination link, is formed), the
network interference can be further reduced by effective spectral utilization. Conse-
quently, various dynamic SA techniques for interference coordination/avoidance have
been researched [39,40,57–59]. If the entire spectrum is divided into a set of subchan-
nels, e.g., as in orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems, each
node can autonomously select the best subchannels in terms of the interference sta-
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tus.6 Additionally, since these SA algorithms result in increased SNIR distributions,
they can also be potential solutions for energy efficiency in collaboration with power
allocation algorithms [60–64]. These joint optimization methods are generally based
on the water-filling (WF) algorithm, which is an optimal power allocation method
used to design interference-limited systems as an enabling technique based on the
spectral diversity for interference and energy management [65, 66]. However, a com-
mon assumption in the above algorithmic solutions proposed in [39, 40, 52–64] is that
all communication sessions carry out data streaming by using all possible subchan-
nels simultaneously. Therefore, in a half-duplex relaying (HDR) system, there always
exist source-to-relay interference links in the first time slot (i.e., the first phase of a
subframe) and relay-to-destination interference links in the second time slot (i.e., the
second phase of a subframe). In this study, I would like to answer the following ques-
tions: i) is this structure of symmetric data streaming by all communication sessions
the best choice in the context of interference minimization? ii) What would happen if
there was a temporal crack7 in the structure of the symmetric transmission?
In this work, I propose a new concept of temporal diversity to efficiently reduce the
network interference in a multiuser two-hop HDR system with a decode-and-forward
(DF) protocol. It has not been reported yet to study the asymmetric transmission,
which is an interference-aware backoff technique where each communication session
(source-relay-destination link) adaptively chooses a certain subset of the spectrally-
parallel data streaming that should be delayed by the duration of one time slot (i.e., half
6On the other hand, block diagonalization or interference alignment [67, 68] are also powerful tech-
niques for interference cancellation by proper beamforming algorithms. However, these schemes are
commonly used in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems, which may face challenges when
applied to ad-hoc networks that only consist of devices with a small size, and generally require a signifi-
cant signaling overhead for exchanging the dedicated data and the global CSI of all users in the network.
Thus, they are inappropriate for use with wireless ad-hoc networks of consisting many communication
sessions.
7This should be easily understood, in consideration of random backoff techniques that aim to avoid
data collision in Wi-Fi systems [69].
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of one subframe). A part of the entire interference links in the networks are changed
according to the autonomous asymmetric transmission of each communication ses-
sion. It should be interpreted that the degree of freedom based on temporal diversity
is created for interference minimization. On the basis of this intuition, I formulate an
asymmetric transmission based interference coordination problem. Depending on the
generation of interference links in the network, I model 0-1 integer linear program-
ming in the HDR system. Since this problem is known to be NP-hard [70], it requires
an immense amount of calculation in order to obtain the corresponding optimal so-
lutions. Consequently, I consider a game theoretic asymmetric transmission scheme
for minimizing the total network interference in multiuser ad-hoc HDR systems. The
first version of the asymmetric transmission game (ATG) is modeled in the form of
the exact potential game [2], and is based on actual interference on every subchannel
among the communication sessions. In ATG, a set of players is a set of communica-
tion sessions. The utility function of each player is formulated by adding the inter-
ference experienced and generated by a player. All players sequentially update their
best-response strategies on the basis of a round-robin rule. According to the property
of this exact potential game, the Nash equilibrium (NE) of ATG is guaranteed. Fur-
thermore, I develop an approximated version of ATG denoted as A-ATG, which is also
an exact-potential game in order to reduce signaling and computational complexity. In
A-ATG, a set of communication sessions select their own transmission strategies by
exchanging potential interference based on the average value of interference over the
spectral domain. I summarize my main contribution as follows:
i) New concept of temporal diversity: I formulate a new interference coordination prob-
lem based on asymmetric transmission in the HDR system.
ii) General game formulation and derivation of convergence properties: I propose
a game-theoretical algorithm as the suboptimal solution, and derive its convergence
properties.
iii) Performance improvement in terms of network interference and energy efficiency: I
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show that the proposed algorithms significantly reduce network interference compared
to the SA scheme. Furthermore, in the context of power consumption while satisfying
rate requirements, the corresponding performance gains are measured up to 17.4%
over the joint SA [39, 40] and WF algorithm [66].
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, an application
of supermodular game, which is titled “Distributed Power Control based Connectivity
Reconstruction Game in Wireless Localization”, is introduce to effectively construct
the network connectivity when operating connectivity and RSS based localization. In
Chapter 3, an application of exact potential game, which is titled “Adaptive Sector
Coloring Game for Geometric Network Information based Inter-Cell Interference Co-
ordination in Wireless Cellular Networks”, is introduced to resolve various shortcom-
ings of conventional static and dynamic ICIC in LTE networks. In Chapter 4, another
application of exact potential game, which is titled “Asymmetric Transmission Game
for Interference Coordination in Wireless Ad-hoc Relay Networks”, is introduced to
apply new concept of temporal diversity utilization for minimizing network interfer-
ence in wireless ad-hoc relay networks. Finally, conclusions were drawn in Chapter 5.
The main abbreviations can be found in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: List of main abbreviations
WSN Wireless sensor network
RSS Received-signal-strength
dw-MDS Distributed weighted multidimensional scaling
NE Nash equilibrium
CRG Connectivity reconstruction game
LTE Long-term evolution





CSI Channel state information
GNI Geometric network information
ICIC Inter-cell interference coordination
FDPS Frequency-domain packet scheduling
ASCG Adaptive sector coloring game





ATG Asymmetric transmission game
A-ATG Approximated version of ATG
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Chapter 2
APPLICATION OF SUPERMODULAR GAME: Dis-
tributed Power Control based Connectivity Reconstruc-
tion Game in Wireless Localization
2.1 Brief Introduction
This study proposes a game-theoretical power control based connectivity reconstruc-
tion algorithm, called CRG, suitable for wireless localization in energy-limited wire-
less sensor network (WSN). The solution of CRG, which is obtained by the properties
of supermodular game, results in the effective connectivity for wireless localization
with energy savings. I think that my proposed algorithm can be effectively utilized in
WSNs according to the system’s objective, e.g., energy consumption or quality of lo-
calization. Additionally, I believe that my contribution can be more valuable in future
WSNs when distribution of sensor nodes would become denser.
2.2 System Model
Assume that there is a set of anchor nodesM = {1, ...,M} and a set of sensor nodes
L = {1, ..., L} in a two-dimensional WSN. The actual location of the node is denoted
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by xm, wherem ∈M∪L. Sensor nodes have unknown positions, while anchor nodes
have priori known positions themselves. Sensor nodes are randomly located in the cir-
cle area with radius R. The anchor nodes are uniformly located on the edge of the
same circle area. Pi is the set of feasible transmission power of node i in a linear scale,
and Pi ∈ Pi is the transmission power at node i. In the case of node i’s transmission
and node j’s reception, the maximum likelihood estimator of the one-sided distance
can be denoted by δ̄ij = d0
(
γ0Pi/Pij
)1/np , where γ0 is the power of attenuation mea-
sured at a reference distance d0 from transmitter i and Pij is the power received by
node j from transmitter i. Pij follows the lognormal distribution, in which the mean
value is P̄ij and the standard deviation is σ. The standard deviation σ represents the
shadowing effect, and it is constant for a sufficiently long period. np is the path loss
exponent, and it is known to all nodes. So, for all i, j ∈ M∪ L, δ̄ij can be measured
when Pij ≥ Psen, where Psen is the sensitivity level for correct demodulation. Consid-
ering the inaccuracy due to the relationship between σ and Pij , even though the same
distance is measured, more reliable values of the measured distance are obtained by
a high transmission power compared to a low one. Finally, the estimated distance be-
tween node i and j, δij , would be δ̄ij , if Pi > Pj , and vice versa. δij is valid when both
δ̄ij and δ̄ji are measurable (i.e., Pij , Pji ≥ Psen), and it is constant during a sufficiently
long period because of the temporal property of σ.
2.3 Proposed Power Control Algorithm
2.3.1 Reliability Function
To solve the network-wide localization problem by using the set of all the δij , I have to
quantify the expected accuracy of δij . I set a reliability function denoted as wij , which
reflects that less accurate measurements are down-weighted in the local optimization
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function for localization in a distributed manner.1 Although σ is concurrently influ-
enced regardless of the received power, this influence is differentially reflected to the
viewpoint of the estimated distance because the function of the estimated distance ver-
sus the received power is decreasing and convex form. As a result, the range of error
would be wider, when estimating distance with low transmission power. To reflect this







 exp{−(δij/hij)2}, if δij is measured0, otherwise. (2.1)
hij is determined by the larger value between the possible transmission coverage







quently, the reliability function wij is in terms of Pi or Pj . Further, by definition of
δij , wij should be zero when Pij < Psen or Pji < Psen. These characteristics imply
that I can control the reliability function along with the connectivity for network-wide
localization through the adequate allocation of transmission power. Let us optimize the
energy-efficient localization by means of controlling transmission power.
2.3.2 Game Formulation
My objective is the relaxation of connectivity while maintaining a similar level with lo-
calization error using full power transmission. Let us address the problem of assigning
a transmission power to each node in a distributed fashion. Because of its distributed
nature, game theory is a valuable tool for this problem, which I can model in a strategic
form as follows:
Definition 1. Connectivity reconstruction game (CRG): < L, Pi, {Ci}i∈L >
1In the SMACOF algorithm of dW-MDS [8], each sensor node solves iteratively the local optimization
formulated by minimizing Si =
∑L+M
j=1,j 6=i wij(δij − ||x̃i − x̃j ||2)
2 for all i, where x̃i is the estimated
position of node i. The higher values and the lesser nonzero terms all wij are, this algorithm shows a
higher performance in terms of localization error.
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i) Player set: L = {1, ..., L} (a set of sensor nodes)
ii) Strategy of player i: Pi ∈ Pi, where i ∈ L





j∈Di Cij(Pi, Pj), where Cij is the partial cost
function of i related to j and Di is the set of nodes connected to node i, i.e., Di =
{j|wij 6= 0}.
The set of players L is exactly the same as the set of sensor nodes. Therefore
I will use the terms “player i” and “node i” interchangeably. Pi is the set of feasible
strategies of player i. Without loss of generality,Pi , [Pi,min, Pi,max]. Pi is the strategy
of player i. For each player i, I write P−i as the joint strategy set of all players in the
set excluding player i. Hence, P is the joint strategy of all the players. Best response
of player i is defined as P ∗i , argminPiCi(Pi,P−i) under given P−i. CRG proceeds
by each player sequentially to update the strategy of each player by round-robin rule.
Consideration for designing the cost function of CRG is twofold:Ci should contain
i) provision for reducing Pi while maintaining its reliability to others (selfish philoso-
phy); ii) information about the neighboring nodes’ benefit or damage in terms of relia-
bility according to the change of Pi (cooperative philosophy). Using these conditions,










− (Pi − Pj)∂([wij(Pi)]
α/Pj)
∂Pi
, if j ∈ Bi
0, otherwise.
(2.2)
where Ai = {j|wij 6= 0 and Pj > Pi} and Bi = Di \ Ai, respectively. The collection
Ai is the subset of Di and transmit a power higher than node i. Further, the collection
Bi is the subset of Di excluding Ai. Recall from (2.1), wij is a function of Pj or Pi
depending on whether player j is in Ai or Bi, if the conditions Pij , Pji ≥ Psen are
satisfied. Based on that, Cij is represented in (2.2). If j ∈ Ai, wij is dependent on Pj ,




in (2.2) is approximately linear in [Pi, Pj ], the corresponding
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Trend line starting from the largest power
Trend line starting from the smallest power
Trend line starting from an arbitrary power
Figure 2.1: NEs of CRG (L = 20, M = 4, and R = 20m).
term is the value of estimated benefit of the player j according to variation of Pi.
Further, system parameter α, which is given by 0 < α < 1, determines a trade-
off between localization reliability and power consumption. When α goes to 0, CRG
gives a higher priority to energy consumption compared to the case when α goes to
1. Therefore, I can choose the value of α according to the characteristics of the target
system.
2.3.3 Convergence Properties of CRG
In this section, I discuss the existence of the NE solution. The NE of CRG is de-
fined as a given strategy P∗ , {PNE1 , ..., PNEL }, if I have Ci(P∗) = Ci(P ∗i ;P∗−i) ≥
Ci(Pi;P
∗
−i) under given P
∗
−i for all i ∈ L. The NE of CRG is the state in which
all players are satisfied with the current transmission power and connectivity with the
neighboring nodes, and there is no further update until the next localization. To show
the existence of the NE of CRG, I can prove that CRG is a supermodular game, as it
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satisfies the Definition 2 in [1]. In a supermodular game, there always exists the pure-
strategy NE when it is played by a sequential best-response dynamic [1]. I will show
that CRG is a supermodular game to prove the assured existence of the NE.
Theorem 1. CRG is supermodular and there exists an NE solution.
Proof : It is trivial to show that the CRG satisfies the first two conditions2 (com-
pactness and lower semi-continuity) in [1]. To verify the third condition of supermod-
ularity (increasing difference) in [1], I separate all possible changes of Pi and Pj into
the following two scenarios according to whether Ci is twice continuously differen-
tiable or not.
i) Moving in continuous region
In this scenario, I obtain the second cross-derivative of Ci, ∂2Ci(P)/∂Pi∂Pj . If j ∈




. Otherwise, if j ∈ Bi, the










. In the case
of hij = d0(γ0Pi/Psen)1/np , the corresponding reliability function, [wij(Pi)]α =




















Pj . Finally, if j ∈ L\Di, wij = 0 and Cij = 0; consequently, ∂2Ci(P)/∂Pi∂Pj = 0.
Thus, ∂2Ci(P)/∂Pi∂Pj ≥ 0 is satisfied for any i and j.
ii) Passing through semicontinuous point
Assuming that P̂i ∈ {Pi|Pij < Psen} and P̃i ∈ {Pi|Pij ≥ Psen}, ∀i, j ∈ L. Let the op-
erator ‘→’ to the change of strategy. Simultaneous changes (e.g., (P̂i → P̃i, P̂j → P̃j))
are invalid because of the sequential update rule of CRG. Then, there are four follow-
ing cases in this scenario of passing through a semicontinuous point: (P̂i, P̂j → P̃j),
(P̂i → P̃i, P̂j), (P̃i, P̂j → P̃j), and (P̂i → P̃i, P̃j). By properly substituting these




can be found in the
closed region, Ci should be lower semi-continuous in P−i as well as Pi. CRG satisfies this condition
according to the definition of Cij in (2.2). If P ∗i is argmaxPiCi, the upper semi-continuity of Ci is
necessary; however, it is not suitable to achieve my objective.
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cases to the definition 1 of [1], the corresponding condition related to Cij can be veri-
fied, which concludes the proof. 
Figure 2.1 represents a snapshot of NE of CRG through plotting trend lines of the
network energy consumption per time step,
∑L
i=1 Pi, starting from Pi = Pi,max =
1mW, Pi = Pi,min = 0mW, and an arbitrary point for all i. In this case, the values
of
∑L
i=1 Pi for the largest and smallest NE are 12.1mW and 9.5mW, respectively.
The two important properties of CRG can be summarized as follows: i) If the users’
best responses are single-valued, and each user uses the best response updates starting
from the smallest (or largest) element of its strategy space, then the strategies converge
to the smallest (or largest) NE. ii) If each user starts from any feasible strategy, the
strategies will eventually lie in the set bounded by the smallest and largest NE of each
component.
Algorithm 2.1 summarizes the steps of the algorithm for CRG, where P(k) and
D(k)i are the joint strategy of all players, P, and the set of sensor nodes communicating
with node i, Di, at the k-th time index, respectively.
Algorithm 2.1 CRG with dw-MDS
Start with arbitrary initial strategy state vector P(0).
while P(k) 6= P(k−1) do
Select player i according to the round-robin rule.
Collect Pj and measure δij , ∀j ∈ D(k)i
Calculate Ci(P(k)) based on (2.2) and solve new best response strategy P ∗i at
time index k and update Pi to P ∗i .
Set k← k + 1.
end while
Run the dw-MDS [8] with wij , ∀i, j, determined by P∗.
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Figure 2.2: Individual energy consumption for localization versus α.
2.4 Simulation Results
I apply the proposed algorithm to the localization problem in a WSN. The dw-MDS [8]
is chosen as the baseline algorithm for the analysis of the performance of dw-MDS
combined with CRG. I demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm on the
network with anchor nodes, M = 4, in a circle area with radius R = 20m. Set of
sensors are randomly located in the same circle area. Pi,min and Pi,max are 0mW and
1mW, respectively, for all i. Thermal noise power is assumed by 1×10−18mW. Further,
the sensitivity level for the reception and correct demodulation Psen is 1×10−9mW. In
addition, np = 3, d0 = 1m, γ0,dB(, 10log10γ0) = −35dB, and σdB(, 10log10σ) =
2dB. I run 200 Monte Carlo simulation trials to evaluate the proposed algorithm in
terms of energy consumption and root mean square error (RMSE).
Figure 2.2 shows the trend lines of each algorithm in terms of individual energy
consumption according to variation of α and L. Although CRG is an additional pro-
cess in localization, it can ensure the efficiency of energy consumption. Naturally,
||P∗||1 ≤
∑
i Pi,max. In addition, the number of iterations necessary for dw-MDS
starting at P∗ is almost the same as that of dw-MDS starting at full power transmis-
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dw−MDS (50% power used)
dw−MDS (70% power used)
Figure 2.3: RMSE versus L.
sion. Further, energy consumption during finding NE, i.e. ||P(0)||1 + · · · + ||P∗||1, is
much smaller than the energy consumption for localization, because CRG converges
to NE very fast. Iteration number of CRG converging to NE is only 1-2 on average.
Assuming the transmit time interval is 1ms, each algorithm in terms of individual en-
ergy consumption is depicted in Figure 2.2. The difference in the individual energy
consumption gains between baseline and proposed algorithms is around 50.8%-61.9%
in the case of α = 0.1 and 36.8%-41.1% in the case of α = 0.9. In addition, CRG
significantly changes the energy consumption according to variation of L. This is why,
if density of sensor nodes is higher, each node easily gathers information about local-
ization by virtue of a large number of neighboring nodes. Consequently, P∗ would be
smaller. It implies that CRG is suitable as a preprocess of distributed localization in
highly dense and energy-limited system.
Next, I show how much damage is caused by the reduction of energy consumption
through CRG to the performance of localization in Figure 2.3. RMSE is chosen as the




(xi − x̃i)T(xi − x̃i)
where x̃i is the estimated location of node i. The average RMSE margins between
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Figure 2.4: Comparison between P∗ and P̃∗ in terms of RMSE (α = 0.1 and L = 20).
dw-MDS with full power transmission and that with CRG is only 0.43m in the case
of α = 0.1 and only 0.26m in the case of α = 0.9. Further, I compare my algo-
rithm to dw-MDS with each setting of P50% , {0.5 × P1,max, ..., 0.5 × PL,max} and
P70% , {0.7× P1,max, ..., 0.7× PL,max}. Although CRG allows for greater reduction
of power consumption than dw-MDS with P70%, they show similar levels of RMSE.
The most interesting outcome is observed in the comparison between dw-MDS with
CRG and P50%. The average RMSE margins between dw-MDS with CRG and that
with P50% is 1.40m if α = 0.1 and 1.58m if α = 0.9. It implies that CRG performs
better in terms of energy consumption and localization error rather than equal power
allocation by heuristic thresholds.
Figure 2.4 shows the effectiveness of CRG when the scenarios that set of sensor
nodes have irregular geometric layouts, through comparison between P∗ and P̃∗ in










L }, which is an equalized
form of P∗. The RMSE margin on average in the entire simulation is 1.75m. Most sig-
nificantly, the RMSE margin on average for the scenarios that have RMSE higher than
10m is 16.42m. It means that differential power allocation based on the state of sensor
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node distribution is more efficient than equal power allocation while the performance
in terms of reduction of power consumption is the same. Thus, my algorithm performs
significantly well when sensor node distribution is irregular so that geographically iso-
lated sensor nodes exist.
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Chapter 3
APPLICATION OF EXACT POTENTIAL GAME: Adap-
tive Sector Coloring Game for Geometric Network In-
formation based Inter-Cell Interference Coordination
in Wireless Cellular Networks
3.1 Brief Introduction
I propose the ASCG and ASCG with a dominant strategy space (ASCG-D), which
are new coordinated-distributed scheme that optimize GNI based ICIC problem. It
is worth noting that ASCG-D requires smaller signaling overhead and computational
load for ICIC implementation than the conventional dynamic ICIC schemes do and
is robust with respect to the latency of X2 interface. Moreover, ASCG-D is an exact
potential game, so it has the advantage of an NE solution always existing. Given that
this study is conducted in a homogeneous cellular network, further studies are required
for a heterogeneous cellular network including femtocells, relay cells, and picocells.
Moreover, my study is expected to lead to interesting results when ASCG-D is com-
bined with beamforming problems in massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
cellular networks using millimeter-wave technology. The main symbols can be found
in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: List of symbols
L The set of eNBs (or cells)
L−l The set of eNBs excluding the eNB l
κl The sector set of the l-th cell
Ml,k The user set located in sector κl,k
N l,k The RB set mapped into the sector κl,k
Tc The shortest time-resolution
TX2 The latency over the X2 interface
Tsu The strategy update period
Tud The longest time-resolution
Yl The sector coloring matrix of cell l
Xl,k The user scheduling matrix of the k-th sector κl,k of cell l
PGl Potential gain without considering interference
PIl Potential interference experienced by eNB l
P IL−l Potential interference generated by eNB l
Ul The utility function of eNB l
ℵl The total feasible strategy space of Y l




I consider a downlink hexagonal cellular network with the eNB (or cell) set L ,
{1, ..., L} and the user setM , {1, ...,M}. Each eNB is located at the center of each
cell and have K sectors, where Kl , {Kl,1, ...,Kl,K} denotes the sector set of the l-th
cell. The user subset Ml,k ⊂ M is randomly located in the sector Kl,k by uniform
distribution. To consider some load imbalance scenarios, I define the concentration
factor λl ,(number of users in the hot sector in the cell )/(number of users in the cell)
where the hot sector is the most populated sector in the cell. For simplicity, the equal
number of users are located in each cell and the concentration factor λ is applied to
all cells such as
∑
k |M1,k| = ... =
∑
k |ML,k| = M/L and λ1 = ... = λL = λ,
respectively. The set of eNBs L−l is the set of eNBs excluding the eNB l from the eNB
set L.
Each eNB can communicate with other eNBs by using the X2 interface in LTE-
A. The RB set is denoted as N , and the system bandwidth is divided into N RBs as
|N | = N , where | · | implies the cardinality. Each RB is the smallest 2-D scheduling
unit consisting of one subframe (=1 ms) and 12 subcarriers (=12×15 kHz). I assume
that each eNB can utilizeN RBs. Pnl denotes the transmit power of the l-th eNB on the
n-th RB. For simplification, I assume that each eNB allocate the equal power to each
RBs, i.e., Pnl = P/N for all l and n, where P is the total transmit power of an eNB.
At each instant, multiple RBs can be assigned to a single user; however, each RB can
be assigned to at most one user. In this study, I assume an infinitely backlogged model;
in other words, at each time instance, the eNB has data available for transmission to
every user.
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3.2.2 Determination of Time Policy
Assuming that Tc is the shortest time-resolution parameter of the entire network. It
is related to the physical features changing fast, such as signal strength experienc-
ing fast fading, SINR, and instantaneous achievable rate. On the other hands, Tud is
the longest time-resolution parameter of the entire network. They are related to the
physical features changing slowly, such as the large-scale attenuation factors and geo-
metric topology of the entire network. Tc and Tud denote the minimum values among
a set of individual channel coherence times and individual user distribution coherence
times, respectively. Generally, the geometrical decorrelated distance is set to 50m in a
system-level simulation [73]; hence, Tud is taken as the time in which the user with the
highest speed passes through the 50m distance. TX2 is the latency over the exchange
of information among the eNBs, and I assume that Tc  TX2  Tud.
3.2.3 Two-Stage Framework of RB Allocation
Let us define two RB allocation matrices. The sector coloring matrix of cell l, Yl ∈
ℵl = {0, 1}N×K , represents a mapping the RB set N to the sector set of Kl, where ℵl
is the set of all possible Yl. Further, yln,k is the n-th row and the k-th column element











n,k ≤ N should be satisfied.N l,k is an RB




nk = |N l,k|. The set of sector
coloring matrices in the entire network is Y = Y1 × · · · ×YL ∈ {0, 1}N×K×L. The
set of sector coloring matrices Y optimize the feasible FDPS space according to every
Tud.
Similar to the sector coloring matrix Yl, the user scheduling matrix of the k-th
sector Kl,k of the cell l, Xl,k ∈ {0, 1}|N
l,k|×|Ml,k|, represents a mappingN l,k toMl,k
by the eNB l. xl,knm is the n-th row and them-th column element of Xl,k, and it is equal









nm ≤ |N l,k| should be satisfied.
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3.3 PROBLEM FORMULATION: Geometric Network In-
formation based ICIC
3.3.1 Outline
Naturally, the performance of1 Xl,k is considerably dependent on the set of sector col-
oring matrices Y. Given Y, the user scheduling matrix Xl,k optimizes the general
objective function of FDPS, such as maximizing
∑
m∈Ml,k log(Rm) where Rm is the
long-term service rate of user m, during the time resolution Tc. A well-formulated
problem for optimizing the set of sector coloring matrices Y depends on which physi-
cal channel features are selected as the variables of optimization problem. Further, the
time-correlation property of the variables of optimization problem determine how fre-
quently Y has to be optimized. In this study, I use the GNI, which is the newly defined
substitute for CSI, as the optimization variable to optimize the set of sector coloring
matrices Y. Let us establish the optimization problem through three questions. i) What
is the GNI? ii) Why do I choose the GNI, and not CSI? iii) How do I formulate the
utility function through the GNI?
3.3.2 What Is the GNI?
GNI is the indicator of geometric information related to the eNBs and users. I denote
the absolute locations of the eNB l and userm toG(l) andG(m), respectively. Further,
G(L) = {[G(l)]}L×1 and G(M) = {[G(m)]}M×1 are geometric information vectors




k Ll,k, respectively. By the definition
of Tud, I assume that G(∪kMl,k) is estimated by the eNB l and every eNB exchange
the estimated GNI of users each other at every Tud.
1In [16], the authors proved that the optimal solution of FDPS, Xl,kopt, is NP-hard. They also obtained
the suboptimal solution Xl,k1/2, which guarantees more than a half of X
l,k
opt in terms of the performance
of FDPS, by an approximation algorithm in polynomial time. By virtue of this contribution, I use this
algorithm in the user scheduling phase and focus on the sector coloring phase for the ICIC problem.
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3.3.3 Temporal Perspective: Why GNI?
The global knowledge of CSI is the best choice as the variable of optimization prob-
lem. However, in a system that has X2 interface latency, such as an LTE-A system,
this choice results in some temporal disadvantages. These disadvantages are much
more critical in high-mobility scenarios. Based on the time-correlation properties, the
global CSI should be updated in every Tc, but GNI should be updated in every Tud.
I can exploit three temporal benefits by virtue of this property: i) relaxation of time
restriction for optimization, ii) reduction of signaling overhead, and iii) insensitivity
to the X2 interface latency TX2. Then, let us consider how I achieve optimization by
using only GNI instead of the global knowledge of CSI.
3.3.4 Spatial Perspective: How do I Design a Suitable Utility Function?
Despite several merits of the temporal perspective, an appropriate objective with spa-
tial consideration is necessary. Designing the utility function by using GNI, I need
new concepts of potential gain and suffered/suffering interference for optimizing the
GNI based ICIC by sector coloring. Potential gain and suffered/suffering interference
are determined by the function of both Y and G(L;M). The performance of sector
coloring is judged by how much potential gain and interference have occurred.
If a user m is associated with the eNB l, the closer the user m comes to the bore-
sight and the absolute location of the the eNB l, the higher desired signal power the
user m receives. On the other hand, if the user m is not associated with the eNB l,
the closer the user m comes to the boresight and the absolute location of eNB l, the
higher interference signal power the user m receives. Thus, each eNB tries to find the
optimal sector coloring matrix for not only maximizing their potential gain, but also
minimizing the two types of potential interference. The potential gain and interference
concepts summarized in Figure 3.1 are concretely explained as follows:
• Potential gain (PGl): This is the concept that the eNB l considers taking advan-
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, while not considering the
interaction between Yl and YL−l(, Y \Yl). PGl is the function of G(l;Ml) and
Yl. PGl consists of three pieces of information. The first piece of information is the
set {|Ml,1|, ..., |Ml,K |}. The second piece of information is the distance between the
eNB l and user m ∈ Ml,k. The third piece of information is the concentration of the
user setMl,k on the line of boresight direction to sector Kl,k. The concept of potential
gain is effective in maximizing the system throughput in the single cell scenario. How-
ever, there are many uncoordinated sources of interference causing degradation of the
system throughput, because potential gain does not consider the interaction between
Y and YL−l .
• Suffered potential interference (PIl): It is an estimated interference of users
in the target cell l by other eNBs. To avoid interference, the eNB l is to receive the
information on YL−l of other eNBs through the X2 interface. All eNBs share sector
coloring information with each other. After receiving the information on YL−l of other
eNBs, the eNB l determines the optimal Yl for avoiding interference and maximizing
the potential gain. Thus, PIl, the potential interference experienced by the target cell
l, is the function of G(L−l;Ml) and Y. Even though the throughput of user setMl
would increase by this interference coordination, this kind of selfish sector coloring
causes the degradation of the throughput of users of adjacent cells.
• Suffering potential interference (PIL−l): PIL−l is the function of G(l;ML−l)
and Y, where ML−l , M \ (Ml). From the network-level perspective, the infor-
mation on the user distribution in other cells is utilized for predicting how much the
current Yl aggravate the performance of other cells.
Considering the above cause-and-effect relationship, let us define the formulae for
the potential gain and interference as follows.
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Recalling that Pnl is the transmit power of the eNB l on RB n and Tud is sufficiently
larger than Tc, I can approximate the useful signal power received by the user m from
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the eNB l on RB n as the term (Pnl +h̄+φ
n
l,m−µl,m−sl,m) in the above equation for the
potential gain PGl in dB scale. This approximation can be applied to the interference
signal. h̄ captures the time-averaged value of fast-fading (due to the Doppler shifts and
the superposition of each multipath components) effects during the period Tud. This




2 . Thus, I choose h̄ as 10 · log10
√
π
2 ' 0.9806 in dB scale, which
is independent of RB n, because the fast-fading effects on each RB n has the same
stochastic process. According to the number of sectors, the antenna gain is represented





, Amax] where θ3dB = 70 deg, Amax = 20dB in the three-
sector case, θ3dB = 35 deg, Amax = 23dB in the six-sector case and −180 ≤ θ < 180
[73]. θl,m is defined as the angle between the boresight of sector antenna and the LOS
direction between the eNB l and the userm. The boresight is defined to be the direction
at which the beam shows the maximum antenna gain. The pathloss gain is given by
µl,m = 128.15 + 37.6log(dl,m), where dl,m is the distance between the eNB l and the
user m measured in km [73]. sl,m is the shadowing factor from the eNB l to the user
m. This factor should be calculated by eNB l’s geometric grid with appropriate spatial
correlation [73]. Observing the statistics of the approximated signal power, I set γl as
the threshold for regulating the proper calculations of potential gain and interference.
The regulation threshold γl according to user m satisfies the following conditions. γl + Pnl + h̄+ φnl,m − µl,m − sl,m ≥ 0, if m ∈Ml.γl + Pnl + h̄+ φnl,m − µl,m − sl,m < 0, otherwise. (3.2)
I choose the regulation threshold γl as the term (−Pnl − h̄ + Amax + µ̄), where
µ̄ = 128.15 + 37.6log(R) and R is the fixed cell-radius. This regulation threshold im-
plies that a proper cell-breathing algorithm controlling γl can solve the load balancing
problem. However, in this study, I assume γl = γj , where ∀l, j ∈ L, for focusing on
ICIC. For simplicity, if there are two or more eNBs satisfying the condition (4.7) on
the user m, the user m is associated to an eNB which has the maximum approximated
signal power.
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3.3.5 GNI based ICIC Problem
By virtue of the proposed temporal and spatial considerations, the proposed optimiza-
tion problem is defined as follows.







in a relaxed time restriction such as the period
Tud.
This is a new ICIC problem based on GNI with temporal and spatial considera-
tion. Let us optimize this problem by game theoretic approach based the coordinated-
distributed scheme in Section IV.
3.4 ADAPTIVE SECTOR COLORING GAME
3.4.1 Design of ASCG
I will examine the effectiveness of the GNI based ICIC by optimizing the set of the
sector coloring matrices Y under given G(L;M) during the period Tud. Although the
optimization problem P1 defined in the previous section can be solved in a centralized
fashion, it is a rather complex task for all eNBs or the radio network controller (RNC)
to determine the optimal sector coloring Y∗ simultaneously. The size of total search
space for optimizing Y is (KN )L in the centralized scheme. Therefore, I try to design
the best response game for implementing the coordinated-distributed scheme with de-
sirable X2 interface utilization, called ASCG, which finds a suboptimal solution of P1.
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The definition of ASCG is as follows.
Definition 3. ASCG: < L,ℵl, {Ul}l∈L >
i) Player set: L = {1, ..., l, ..., L} (eNB set)
ii) Strategy of player l: Yl ∈ ℵl
iii) Utility of player l: Ul(G(l;M),Y)
Based on the temporal characteristics of GNI, P1 is periodically updated every Tud.
Then, every eNB sequentially and autonomously tries to find the suboptimal solution
of P1 by implementing ASCG. Let us define the strategy update period Tsu as the
sum of the signaling latency period TX2 and the calculation period in which the eNB
l searches for the local optimal Yl∗ , argmaxUl(G(l;M),Y) in the current state
of the fixed strategies of other eNBs YL−l . Strategy Yl of the player l (or the eNB
l) is an element of the total feasible strategy space ℵl, where |ℵl| = KN . I assume
Tc  TX2 < Tsu  Tud. Therefore, let us determine Y , ×l∈LYl which is the
suboptimal solution of P1, while the game proceeds by each player sequentially to
update the strategy of each player by round-robin rule according to every Tsu and
autonomously to maximize its individual utility Ul(Y) searching for the best response
strategy depending on the strategy of other players.
1) Strategy update policy: The strategy update policy of ASCG is that each player
updates its strategy in a predetermined order. For each iteration, players update their
strategies by following the round-robin rule. The players compute their own utility in
their own turn and update their strategy as follows.
Yl[isu]← Yl∗[isu] , argmaxUl(Y[isu − 1]),
YL−l [isu]← YL−l [isu − 1],
where the time index isu = L× q + l and q = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (3.4)
2) Meaning of NE of ASCG: To obtain the suboptimal solution of P1 by ASCG, let
us define the NE of ASCG as follows.
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Table 3.2: Minimization of number of cases of brute force search
i) Extraction of the dominant feasible strategy space
ℵDl
(












, argmin[PIl + PIL−l ].





∗ ) ≥ Ul(Yl;Y
L−l
∗ ) for all l.
At an NE, no player is able to improve its utility with a unilateral deviation. The NE
is the state that all players are satisfied, and there is no more update until next update
of GNI. Convergence to NE of ASCG means determination of an ideal static ICIC
state through GNI based ICIC. It also means that every eNB set L need not change
the sector coloring strategies until next update of GNI. In the following subsection,
I introduce ASCG with a dominant strategy space noted as ASCG-D. The dominant
strategy space ℵDl result in the reduction of the solution search space of ASCG and
guarantee the existence of at least one NE by demonstrating that ASCG-D is an exact
potential game.
3.4.2 ASCG with a Dominant Strategy Space
Although the complexity of the original ICIC problem is reduced by virtue of ASCG,
the update of the best response strategy Yl∗ for ASCG is also challenging because of
the exponentially expanding solution space. Moreover, I need to minimize this sub-
sidiary complexity to guarantee a complexity level similar to those of conventional
static ICIC schemes, which do not have any subsidiary complexity for the ICIC pro-
cess. For an eNB l, there areKN different ASCG strategies in the total feasible strategy
space ℵl. In practical systems, K is generally equal to 3 or 6. However, the number of
RBs N can be quite large.





Partitioned total feasible strategy space
Dominant feasible
strategy space
Total feasible strategy space 
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having the same .
??
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② Select best response strategy
Figure 3.2: Process of minimizing number of cases of brute-force search in ASCG.
feasible strategy space ℵl to the dominant feasible strategy space ℵDl . My intuition is
that a proper divide-and-conquer method using the property of the potential gain can
drastically reduce the number of cases requiring a brute-force search for finding the
best response in the total feasible strategy space. Before describing ℵDl , let us discuss
an interesting property of the potential gain.
Property 1. Homeostasis of potential gain For two different sector coloring
matrices Yl and Ỹl with |N l,k| = |Ñ l,k| for ∀k, PGl(Yl) = PGl(Ỹl) is always
satisfied.
The potential gain PGl of the eNB l is independent of the strategy YL−l of other
players. Additionally, frequency-selective characteristic according to RBs is not re-
flected in the potential gain PGl. Therefore, the potential gain PGl is only dependent
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on the cardinal number set {|N l,1|, ..., |N l,K |}. By virtue of Property 1, I add con-
straint (3.5) to the process to determinate the best-response strategy Yl∗ for reducing











µl,m − sl,m))), I impose the constraint for each player l as
|N l,1| = dN ·
wl,1∑
k∈Kl wl,k








where d·e represents the ceiling operation. (3.5)




l } as a partition of the feasible strat-
egy space ℵl, where the partition number is PS and a section of partition ℵpsl is the
set of possible strategies Yl that have the same PGl =
∑
k∈Kl wl,k. To minimize the
number of cases of brute-force search, a two-step process is followed as explained in
Table 3.2. Henceforth, I refer to the ASCG with the dominant feasible strategy space
ℵDl as ASCG-D.

















N l,kD is the RB subset that is mapped into the sector Kl,k by a sector coloring strategy
Yl ∈ ℵDl . Based on the definition of dominant feasible strategy space ℵDl , |N
l,k
D | is not
changed, if Yl is selected in ℵDl . Through this two-step process, the number of cases











process of minimizing the number of cases of brute-force search is shown in Figure
3.2.
2In special geometric conditions, such as the case of hot sectors in each cell geometrically concen-
trated, potential interference mitigation for cell-edge users by ASCG might aggravate the performances
of multiuser diversity gain and user fairness. By constructing this heuristic and compulsory constraint
(3.5), ASCG-D can keep the fixed and reasonable values of multiuser diversity gain and user fairness.
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Start point of new game
NE point
Figure 3.3: Improvement path of ASCG-D in one-drop (L = 7,M = 140, N =
25,K = 3, P = 43dBm, and detailed parameter settings are described in section 3.5).
Moreover, I will show that ASCG-D is an exact potential game to show its guaran-
tee of the existence of the NE. The representative characteristic of the exact potential
game is that there always exists the pure-strategy NE when the corresponding players
play with the sequential best-response dynamics. For any two different strategies Yl
and Ỹl, ASCG-D is an exact potential game if and only if there exists the network
potential function F (Y) satisfying the following condition.
Condition 1. Network potential function of ASCG-D If an eNB l changes its
strategy from Yl to Ỹl while YL−l remains unchanged, then
Ul(Ỹ
l;YL−l)− Ul(Yl;YL−l) = F (Ỹl;YL−l)− F (Yl;YL−l). (3.6)
38
(a) Components of ASCG-D 
are changed (antenna pattern 
gain, path-loss gain, and 
shadowing updated.) and the 
next ASCG-D is generated at 
every 𝑇𝑢𝑑 
(b) Utility of ASCG-D (potential 
gain, potential interference) are 
changed according to other 
player’s strategy and all players’ 
ASCG-D strategies are updated 
sequentially at every 𝑇𝑠𝑢 
cell 𝑙  cell 𝑙  cell 𝑙  










































(c) All CSI are changed and  
all eNBs’ low-complexity  
FDPS strategy are updated  
 simultaneously at every 𝑇𝑐 
eNB (𝑙-1)’s 
turn to update 
ASCG-D strategy 
All eNBs’ turn to  
update FDPS strategy 
eNB 𝑙’s 
turn to update 
ASCG-D strategy 
eNB (𝑙 +1)’s 
turn to update 
ASCG-D strategy 
Information of user distribution 
in network update 
Figure 3.4: Framework of ASCG-D and FDPS.
Basically, this condition means that the change in a single player’s utility due
to only its own strategy deviation results in exactly the same amount of change in
the exact potential function. I can verify that ASCG-D is an exact potential game
if the network potential function F (Y) is 12
∑L
l=1 Ul(Y). The corresponding proof
is represented in Appendix C. The improvement path of network potential function
F (Yl;YL−l) of ASCG-D according to every Tsu of an example one-shot game is
shown in Figure 3.3. I can see that as eNBs run ASCG-D, the improvement path of
network potential function monotonically increases until the algorithm converges after
only 16 steps, i.e., around 2 decisions of best-response strategy per player on average.
Theoretically, according to [72], the length of the improvement path converging
to NE is at most L2 using the best response dynamics in L-player game. This con-
vergence speed implies that the computational complexity for optimizing Y by means
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). Thus, ASCG-D is a suitable suboptimal approach of P1 by virtue of the
guarantee of NE as well as the reduction of the feasible strategy space ℵl to ℵDl .
Algorithm 3.2 Implementation of ASCG-D and FDPS
Initialize the time index to form an expression (iud = isu = ic = 0, where iud and
ic is the time index related to Tud and Tc, respectively).
User distribution updated and new ASCG-D generated at the time iudTud.
Establish the geometric loadmap G(L) and G(M) by exchanging GNI each other.
[ASCG-D part]
while iudTud ≤ isuTsu < (iud + 1)Tud or until convergence to NE do
Pick player l according to the round-robin rule.
Player l extracts the dominant feasible strategy space ℵDl ∈ ℵl and solve the best-
response strategy Yl∗,D ∈ ℵDl .
Player l broadcasts Yl∗,D to the other players through X2 interface during TX2.
[FDPS part]
while isuTsu ≤ icTc < (isu + 1)Tsu do
Given Y, all player l solve the Xl,k1/2 by using the approximation algorithm [16].
Set ic ← ic + 1
end while
Set isu← isu + 1
end while
Set iud← iud + 1 and repeat steps 2-15.
3.4.3 Summary of System Operation
A summary of the overall algorithm for implementation of ASCG-D and FDPS is
presented in Algorithm 3.2. Through sector coloring determined by ASCG-D, the sub-
optimal FDPS space Y∗ are achieved. During the time period Tsu, the suboptimal
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solution of Xl,k1/2 is solved b
Tsu
Tc
c times with fixed sector scheduling Y∗ by ASCG-D,
where b·c represents the flooring operation. The overall system operation over time is
shown in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.4(a) shows the process of a new ASCG-D generated at
every Tud. Figure 3.4(b) shows the operation of an ASCG-D in which is every player
sequentially updates its ASCG-D strategy to maximize its utility function at every Tsu.
Finally, Figure 3.4(c) shows the simultaneous operation of FDPS at every Tc.
3.5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
3.5.1 Simulation Settings and Baselines for Comparison
This section presents a system-level simulation performed for validating my proposed
schemes. During the simulation, the users move by a random walk process with an
arbitrary speed chosen among 3, 30, and 180 km/h. I use a simple handover method
based on signal power for focusing the performance related to the ICIC problem. I
set the handover margin to 8 dB. Specifically, the handover period is set to exactly
the same value as Tud to maintain the state of user association while operating my
proposed algorithms. I run 500 Monte Carlo simulation trials and the runtime of each
simulation trial is 2000 subframes. The detailed simulation assumptions are outlined
in Table 3.3.
I choose the dynamic ICIC schemes (CSI based ICIC (global optimal), fractional
graph coloring (FGC), and interference minimization game (IMG)) as well as the static
ICIC schemes (reuse-1, reuse-3, PFR) as the baselines for the analysis of the perfor-
mance of a GNI based ICIC (optimal of P1) and ASCG-D (suboptimal of P1). FGC
and IMG are the conventional graph and game, respectively, theoretic approaches for
the dynamic ICIC solution. To implement the FGC, I set delay time Tc,de, which con-
tains various delays such as signaling, processing, and synchronization, to 200 ms and
the update period Tc,period to 1000 ms. Consequently, the solution of FGC continues
during every 800 ms window (Tc,period−Tc,de). The initial state of FGC is set to reuse-
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Table 3.3: System simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Cellular layout 7 eNBs (or cells), 3 sectors per cell
Carrier frequency 2 GHz
System bandwidth/RB bandwidth 5 MHz / 180 kHz (Downlink)
Number of RBs 25
Subcarriers per RB 12
Cell-level user distribution concentrated (λ = 0.6)
Inter-site distance (ISD) 500 m
eNB Tx power 43 dBm
Number of users per cell 20




Pathloss model As in 3GPP TS 36.814 V9.0.0
Standard deviation of shadowing 8 dB
The decorrelated distance 50 m
User speed 3, 30, 180 km/h
Transmit time interval (TTI) 1 ms
Tc / TX2 / Tsu / Tud 1 ms / 10 ms / 20 ms / 1000 ms
Handover margin / period 8dB / 1000 ms
Traffic model Full buffer
Observation time 2000 ms
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1. The solution of FGC is obtained by means of the suboptimal heuristic Dsatur like
in [30]. In addition, I have added the interference minimization game (IMG) in [39]
as a conventional game theoretic approach. I set IMG’s initial strategy to reuse-1. I
also set RB utilization to 15 to overcome the limitation of IMG in which players select
any RBs to avoid interference, which is also mentioned in [39]. In IMG, each player
sequentially selects the best 15 RBs with respect to minimizing the sum of the to-
tal interference the corresponding player receives from the environment and the total
interference generated by the player that is contributed to the environment. Like in
ASCG-D, Tsu and Tud are adapted to IMG as the strategy update period and game
generation period, respectively.
I evaluate the system performance in terms of the following parameters: the SINR
distribution, system throughput, user fairness, signaling overhead, and computational
load.
3.5.2 SINR Distribution and Average User Throughput
In Figure 3.5, I demonstrate an example of one-shot game to examine the average user
SINR versus the subframe for each scheme. The average SINR margin between the
CSI based ICIC and the GNI based ICIC is found to be 1.59 dB. Further, the aver-
age SINR margin between ASCG-D and GNI based ICIC is only 1.58 dB. I can show
that ASCG-D is the well-coordinated suboptimal approach for the GNI based ICIC. In
ASCG-D, a new game is generated at every Tud. The average SINR margin between
ASCG-D and reuse-1 is found to be 7.25 dB. An interesting point to note here is that
ASCG-D shows a similar performance to (or even lower performance than) PFR in
the initial point after user distribution updates. However, after every eNB proceeds
with ASCG-D, ASCG-D shows a higher performance than PFR immediately. As a re-
sult, integration of results in the time grid of 0 to 2000ms reveals ASCG-D to have
an average SINR gain of 4.62 dB in comparison to PFR. The average SINR margin
between ASCG-D and CSI based ICIC is only 3.18 dB. ASCG-D also outperforms
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Figure 3.5: Average user SINR versus subframe for λ = 0.6.
FGC and IMG, which are conventional dynamic ICIC schemes. ASCG-D has average
SINR gains of 3.05 dB and 3.81 dB in comparison with FGC and IMG, respectively.
Unlike ASCG-D, FGC must need the central entity to solve ICIC optimization. To re-
duce the computational complexity, which explosively increases with the number of
coordinated eNBs, the central entity chooses the suboptimal heuristic Dsatur method
for coloring the graph. This limitation of conventional scheme causes the lower perfor-
mance than ASCG-D, in spite of existence of central entity. After the delay time, which
is set to 200ms, SINR distribution of FGC immediately increases by virtue of the sub-
optimal heuristic Dsatur method. However, this performance gain falls down due to a
variation of global CSI during the rest period. Additionally, I compared ASCG-D to
IMG. Since IMG operates based on CSI, this algorithm cannot find an NE in an LTE
system with an X2 interface having high user mobility. If users are static, the network
potential function of IMG should be monotonically increasing. However, in a realis-
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Figure 3.6: Performance of FDPS with each ICIC schemes for a varying number of
users per cell (λ = 0.6).
tic system, the network potential function of IMG cannot increase steadily due to fast
channel fading related to the existence of high-speed users. Moreover, SINR distribu-
tion of IMG is oscillating because each eNB calculates the best response strategy with
the channel information already changed. This demonstrates that ASCG-D is a highly
effective solution for maximizing the SINR distribution without the global knowledge
of CSI.
Figure 3.6 shows a comparison of the average user throughput of FDPS with the
various ICIC schemes for a varying number of users per cell, which is obtained by
500 Monte Carlo simulation trials. In the case of the total user throughput, ASCG-D
is better than reuse-1 by only 3.5%, even though the average SINR margin between
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these schemes is 7.25 dB. This result is attributed to the fact that the multiuser diver-
sity gain of reuse-1, in which there are non-partitioning FDPS strategy spaces, is much
higher than that of ASCG-D even though every strategy of the dominant strategy set
guarantees good multiuser diversity gain. On the other hand, FGC and IMG show poor
performance in terms of system throughput compared with ASCG-D. It is caused by
both the low level of SINR distribution as shown in Figure 5 and, more crucially, an
inefficient form of an FDPS strategy space. In FGC, RBs are assigned to the UEs such
that no two UEs are assigned the same RB if they are connected in the graph, and the
central entity performs this assignment for entire users in the network. Consequently,
each user is assigned a small number of RBs. Further, in IMG, all users in a cell com-
pete with each other to be scheduled within only 15 RBs. For these reasons, the FDPS
strategy spaces made by FGC and IMG are not enough to efficiently schedule the users.
As a result, ASCG-D shows better performance in terms of average user throughput
than FGC and IMG, improving by 11.8% and 15.3%, respectively. However, when the
number of users per cell is 10, ASCG-D shows relatively small performance gains in
terms of average user throughput compared with FGC and IMG of 5.79% and 4.55%,
respectively. Because the advantage of ASCG-D is highly correlated to dynamic level
of environments such as the number of high-speed users, my proposed scheme shows
better performance in denser and more dynamic networks. ASCG-D especially shows
higher performance in the case of the worst 10% of user throughput. It comes from
the proper constraint (3.5) aiming for the high performance of FDPS. The difference
in the average user throughput gains between static ICIC schemes and ASCG-D is
3.5%-44.1% in the case of the total user throughput and 109.4%-221.5% in the case
of the worst 10% of user throughput. The performance gains of ASCG-D compared
with FGC and IMG are verified as 76.6% and 91.5%, respectively, in the case of the
worst 10% of users. On the other hand, the performance of the CSI based ICIC is only
13.0% and 5.6% higher than that of ASCG-D in the cases of the total user throughput
and the worst 10% of user throughput, respectively.
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Figure 3.7: Average signaling overhead per TTI for a varying number of users per cell
(λ = 0.6).
3.5.3 Signaling Overhead for ICIC and FDPS
Figure 3.7 shows the simulation results of the average signaling overhead per TTI
for a varying number of users per cell. The signaling overheads of the static ICIC
schemes consist of bits only for FDPS because of the absence of signaling for ICIC.
The resolution for CSI BCSI is 4 bits per RB in 3GPP LTE Release 8 [43]. Bud is
the number of bits for indicating a geometrical user distribution per Tud, and is equal
to dlog2(Snetwork/Sunit)e, where Snetwork and Sunit are the area of the entire network
(' 2.5 · 106m2) and the area of a de-correlated unit (' 50m · 50m = 2500m2),
respectively. Thus, the resolution for the user distribution Bud is chosen to be 10 bits.
Bsu is the number of bits for representing Yl per Tsu and is equal toN×dlog2Ke, and
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notN ·K, because one RB can be allocated to only one sector. In the simulation,Bsu =
25× 2 = 50bits. In the case of CSI based ICIC, at every Tc, BCSI ·L ·N ·M bits are
necessary for ICIC. However, additional signaling of ASCG-D results in a very relaxed
time restriction on the updates, such as Tud and Tsu. ASCG-D requires Bud · L ·M at
every Tud and Bsu · (L − 1) bits at every Tsu for ICIC. The overhead of FDPS with
ASCG-D is normally larger than those of FDPS with reuse-3 and FDPS with PFR
by margins of 1.89% and 4.92%, respectively. The signaling overhead of FDPS with
ASCG-D is 1/20th that of FDPS with reuse-1 without ICIC. This is because ASCG-
D reduces the overhead of FDPS by partitioning FDPS spaces, but reuse-1 requires
signaling overhead of all the CSI of all users at every TTI for the implementation
of FDPS. The overhead of FDPS with FGC is 13.6 times that of FDPS with ASCG-
D since FGC requires signaling overhead for all of the CSI of every user at every
TTI during the delay time. Naturally, a shorter delay time (< 200 ms) can reduce
the overhead of FDPS with FGC; but it results in a lower performance gain in SINR
distribution. Likewise, the overhead of FDPS with IMG is 1.35 times that of FDPS with
ASCG-D. IMG has the benefit that each eNB can estimate the strategies of other eNBs
by measuring which RBs are selected by other eNBs. Thus, IMG does not need to
exchange strategy information. However, the exchange of interference information at
every Tsu is necessary to calculate the utility function, including the total interference
generated by the corresponding player that is contributed to the environment and the
total interference the player receives from the environment. This exchange incurs a
large signaling overhead. The signaling overhead of FDPS with CSI based ICIC is up
to 144 times higher than FDPS with ASCG-D. The overhead of FDPS with ASCG-D
is slightly larger than that of FDPS with a GNI based ICIC by a margin of 2.01%. The
overhead results from each eNB sending GNI only to the central entity in a GNI based
ICIC instead of broadcasting GNI to every eNB as occurs in ASCG-D. The amount of
signaling overhead is specifically explained in Appendix D.
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Figure 3.8: Computational load of ASCG according to irregularity of user distribution.
3.5.4 Reduction of Feasible ASCG Strategy Space
As shown in Figure 3.8, there is a considerable reduction in the computational load as
compared to the time required for brute-force search on account of ℵl being converted
to ℵDl under variation of the concentration factor λ = [0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9]. Inter-
estingly, when the user distribution becomes more irregular, the number of cases in
the brute-force search becomes smaller by virtue of the fact that a smaller number of
cases is required for searching the best response strategy Yl∗,D in the dominant feasi-
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is 0.57% and 7.08 × 10−8%, respectively. When the concentration factor λ is larger,
the computational load of FDPS naturally converges to that of FDPS with reuse-1 (if
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λ = 1 is equivalent to FDPS with reuse-1). Therefore, ASCG-D is very useful for
implementing with FDPS on account of a reduction of the computational load with an
increase in the concentration factor λ.
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Chapter 4
APPLICATION OF EXACT POTENTIAL GAME: Asym-
metric Transmission Game for Interference Coordina-
tion in Wireless Ad-hoc Relay Networks
4.1 Brief Introduction
In this work, I introduce asymmetric transmission to reduce network interference in
wireless multiuser ad-hoc networks with a two-hop relaying protocol. I formulate the
asymmetric transmission problems in HDR systems, and construct the game-theoretical
algorithm, called ATG, for deriving suboptimal solutions. The proposed algorithm
guarantees the existence of the NE. Furthermore, I developed A-ATG based on the
value of spectral averaging in order to reduce signaling and computational complexity
of ATG. Compared with the conventional methods, the two algorithms show a signifi-
cant decrease in network interference. Ultimately, the energy consumption for satisfy-
ing the rate requirement is also reduced by 17.4%. For specific applications, I expect
that the proposed algorithms can be easily applied to the autonomous outband D2D
communication scenarios. With a proper change in game formulation, ATG and A-
ATG can also be utilized in more various scenarios, including the underlaying inband,
overlaying inband, and controlled outband D2D communication scenarios, which are
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S1-R1 R1D1 : 1st time slot : 2nd time slot : Desired link  
at 1st time slot 
: Desired link  
at 2nd time slot 
: Interference link  
at 1st time slot 
: Interference link  
at 2nd time slot 
/Backoff/ : Blank time slot 
Figure 4.1: Link activation flow for data streaming and change of interference topology
on a certain subchannel.
mixed with an infrastructure system consisting a central entity (e.g., evolved NodeB)
and cellular users. Suggestions for further research include extending this work to mul-
tiuser ad-hoc network with MIMO systems or multi-hop relaying protocol systems.
4.2 Problem Formulation
4.2.1 System Preliminaries
I consider wireless ad-hoc networks within a multiuser SISO-OFDM framework. I
assume a two-hop relaying scenario consisting of a set of communication sessions
C , {C1, ...,CM} with a DF relaying protocol. The i-th communication session (Ci)
consists of three nodes: the source node (Si), relay node (Ri), and destination node
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(Di). Every node in the network is randomly distributed over the two-dimensional re-
gion. In particular, nodes that belong to the same communication session are concen-
trated within their communication range. For simplicity, there is no direct link from
Si to Di. I assume that Ri, which acts as a relay node to help the communication be-
tween Si andDi, is given a priori. I consider a spectrum-sharing network with a system
bandwidth W divided into a set of orthogonal subchannels K = {1, ...,K}. Si and Ri
each have a total transmit power P . Let Hkab denote the channel gain from a transmis-
sion node a (source or relay node) to a reception node b (relay or destination node)
on subchannel k. I assume block-fading in the time-domain, which means that Hkab is
stationary during a sufficiently long period. Signal power from transmission node a to




a is the transmit power
of node a on subchannel k. I denote Ik(a, b) as interference from node a to node b
on subchannel k, and it is defined in the case that if a ∈ {Si, Ri} and b ∈ {Rj , Dj},
where ∀i 6= j. Except for these cases, P kaHkab is a desired signal power. In this study, I
assume an infinitely backlogged model, where every Ci has data for transmission.
4.2.2 The Concept of Asymmetric Transmission for Interference Coor-
dination: A Simple Example
Ck0 and Ck1 are sets of communication sessions choosing symmetric and asymmetric
transmission, respectively, at subchannel k. Therefore, Ck0 ∪ Ck1 = C is satisfied for
every subchannel k. The set of all possible K-tuple of a user set partition is defined
as C̄ , {Ck0 , Ck1}K×1. Figure 4.1 shows the link activation flow for data streaming and
change of interference topology on subchannel k.
The left side of Figure 4.1 illustrates that every communication session selects
symmetric transmission, i.e., Ck0 = {C1,C2,C3} and Ck1 = ∅. On the other hand,
the right side of Figure 4.1 represents that only the second communication session
selects asymmetric transmission and the others select symmetric transmission, i.e.,
Ck0 = {C1,C3} and Ck1 = {C2}. This means that C2 starts data streaming after resting
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during the first time slot. By such a backoff operation, active links sharing the same
time slot are altered, and consequently, network interference is changed from left to
right in Figure 4.1.




k(Si, Rj) at the first time slot and
∑
i 6=j I
k(Ri, Dj) at the second






k(S3, D2) at the
first time slot, and Ik(R1, R2)+Ik(R1, D3)+Ik(S2, D1)+Ik(S2, D3)+Ik(R3, D1)+
Ik(R3, R2) at the second time slot. Such an example implies that network interference
minimization could be achieved by appropriately assigning symmetric and asymmetric
transmission strategies to each communication session.
4.2.3 Optimization Problem
In an HDR system, the sum of interferences for both the first and the second time slot
from Cj to Ci on subchannel k, is defined as follows:
Ikij =

Ik(Sj , Ri) + I
k(Rj , Di), if {Ci,Cj} ∈ Ck0
Ik(Sj , Ri) + I
k(Rj , Di), if {Ci,Cj} ∈ Ck1
Ik(Rj , Ri) + I
k(Sj , Di), otherwise.
(4.1)
It is obvious that Ikij = 0 for ∀k, if i = j. Then, the optimal user set partition based
on the symmetric/asymmetric transmission selection problem is formulated as the fol-
lowing (K ×M) size of 0-1 integer programming.
P2. Asymmetric transmission in HDR system Find the optimal K-tuple of a parti-







Although the above optimization problem (termed P2) can be solved in a cen-
tralized fashion to obtain an optimal solution, it is a rather complex task because 0-1
integer programming is known to be NP-hard. Thus, I propose an game-theoretic dis-
tributed algorithm to obtain the suboptimal solution while reducing the computational
complexity.
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4.3 Asymmetric Transmission Game
4.3.1 Game Formulation
Definition 5. ATG: < C, S, {Ui}i∈C >
i) i) Set of players: C = {C1, ...CM}
ii) Strategy of player i: si ∈ Si = {0, 1}K×1












Let the set of communication sessions C = {C1, ...,CM} denote the set of players.
I will use the terms “player i” and “communication session Ci” interchangeably. The
space for the strategy profiles is defined by S = S1×· · ·×SM , where Si , {0, 1}K×1
is the set of feasible strategies of player i. A strategy of player i, si ∈ Si, is a (K× 1)-
size vector. For each si, I write s−i as the joint strategy of all players except player
i. Hence, s = (si, s−i) is the joint strategy of all players. Each of the elements in si,
si,k ∈ {0, 1}, implies that si,k = 0 if Ci ∈ Ck0 and 1 if Ci ∈ Ck1 . The utility Ui(si, s−i)
of player imeans the interference generated and experienced by the player. In addition,








Let the strategy state s(n) denote the joint strategy of all players at the n-th step.
ATG is implemented by sequential best-response dynamics, i.e., the strategy state is
updated by s(n) ← s(n−1) s(n−1)i,∗ . In other words, s(n) is updated by substituting the
i-th element of s(n−1) to s(n−1)i,∗ = argmaxsi [Ui(s
(n−1))].
4.3.2 Convergence and Optimality Properties of Asymmetric Transmis-
sion Game
In this section, I prove the convergence properties of ATG which is the form of the ex-
act potential game. The exact potential games were first introduced by Monderer and
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Figure 4.2: Improvement path of ATG in one drop (M = 10, K = 6, W = 5 MHz,
P = 23 dBm (equal power allocation to all subchannels)); detailed parameter set-
tings and graphical representation of the locations of the communication sessions are
described in section 4.4.
Shapley. Recently, it has been widely utilized as a tool to resolve various resource al-
location problems in wireless networks [38,71]. For any two different strategies si and
s̃i, a game is an exact potential game if and only if there exists the network potential
function Θ(s) satisfying
Ui(s̃i, s−i)− Ui(si, s−i) = Θ(s̃i, s−i)−Θ(si, s−i), ∀i. (4.3)
The representative characteristic of the exact potential game is that there always exists
a pure-strategy NE when it plays by sequential best-response dynamics. I will show
that ATG is the exact potential game to guarantee the existence of the NE.
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Proof : Condition (4.3) of an exact potential game will hold if I consider the net-


































In addition, Θk(s) = Θk(si, s−i) is expressed as














= Uki (si, s−i) + o(s−i), (4.5)
where o(s−i) takes a constant value that is independent of si. It depends only on the
strategies of other players with each other. Suppose that player i changes its strategy
si to s̃i, Θk(s̃i, s−i) would be changed to














= Uki (̃si, s−i) + o(s−i). (4.6)
From the equations (4.5) and (4.6), I can conclude that Uki (s̃i, s−i) − Uki (si, s−i) =
Θk(s̃i, s−i) − Θk(si, s−i), ∀k ∈ K. Using this relationship, the condition (4.3) is
satisfied.
According to Theorem 2, ATG is an exact potential game and thus guarantees
a stable suboptimal solution. Let us show an example of one-drop ATG. Improve-
ment path, [· · · ,Θ(s(n−1)),Θ(s(n)), · · · ], is described in Figure 4.2. Each step on the
horizontal axis refers to a decision made by a player. From the figure, I can observe
that the network potential function increases monotonically until it achieves an NE.
It is shown that the performance of ATG closely approaches to the NE even within
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Algorithm 4.3 : Asymmetric transmission game
Start with arbitrary initial strategy state s(0) (or start with si,k = 0 for ∀i, k).
while sn 6= s(n−1) do
Select player i according to the round-robin rule at iteration n.
Calculate the utility of player i on basis of actual interference generated and
experienced by itself.






strategy state s(n) ← s(n−1)  s(n−1)i,∗ by broadcasting s
(n−1)
i,∗ .
Set n← n+ 1.
end while
one-round play. Furthermore, the NE point approximately achieves the optimal point
(Θ(s(0)) = −0.84 × 10−6, Θ(s(M)) = −0.40 × 10−6, Θ(s(2M)) = −0.36 × 10−6,
Θ(s∗) = −0.34× 10−6, where s∗ , argmaxsΘ(s)).
Algorithm 4.3 summarizes the steps of the algorithm for ATG. In line 1, each
player starts with some random initial condition or generally starts with si,k = 0 for
∀i, k. Then, the loop from lines 2 to 6 is executed until the algorithm converges to the
NE.
4.3.3 Approximated Version of Asymmetric Transmission Game
In lines 4 and 5 of Algorithm 4.3, each player individually solves the independent
local optimization problems through every subchannel to resolve the best-response
strategy. I introduce an approximate version of ATG (termed A-ATG) to reduce both
the computational complexity and signaling overhead. Compared to ATG, which re-
quires channel information for every subchannel, A-ATG is designed to work with the
potential interference as a single representative parameter. Let us define the potential
interference PIij between Ci and Cj as follows.
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Table 4.1: Computational complexity and signaling overhead
ATG A-ATG
Computational complexity O(KMN) O(MN)
Signaling overhead 4K(M − 1)BCSI 4(M − 1)BCSI
PIij =

L(Sj , Ri) + L(Rj , Di), if {Ci,Cj} ∈ C0
L(Sj , Ri) + L(Rj , Di), if {Ci,Cj} ∈ C1
L(Rj , Ri) + L(Sj , Di), otherwise.
(4.7)
C0 and C1 are sets of communication sessions choosing symmetric and asymmetric
transmission, respectively. L(a, b) can be easily analyzed by reception node b, and it
is represented by 1K
∑K
k=1 I
k(a, b). In A-ATG, each communication session does not
exchange full channel information on every subchannel, but exchange partial chan-
nel information as the spectrally averaged value of actual interference. As a result,
although the efficiency degradation of a suboptimal solution would be possible, the
local optimization problem of each player and the corresponding signaling overhead
for exchanging information are reduced by the order of 1/K. Let us define A-ATG as
follows.
Definition 6. A-ATG: < C,B, {ui}i∈C >
i) Set of players: C = {C1, ...CM}
ii) Strategy of player i: bi ∈ Bi = {0, 1}
iii) Utility of player i:
ui(b) = ui(bi,b−i) = −
M∑
j=1,i 6=j
(PIji + PIij). (4.8)
Let the set of communication sessions C = {C1, ...,CM} denote the set of players,
same as for ATG. The space for the strategy profiles is defined by B = B1×· · ·×BM ,
where Bi is the set of feasible strategies of player i. For a specific bi ∈ Bi, bi = 0 if
Ci ∈ C0 and 1 otherwise. For each bi, I write b−i as the joint strategy set of all players
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Algorithm 4.4 : Approximated asymmetric transmission game
Start with arbitrary initial strategy state b(0) (or start with bi = 0 for ∀i).
while bn 6= b(n−1) do
Select player i according to the round-robin rule at iteration n.
Calculate the utility of player i on basis of potential interference generated and
experienced by itself.






strategy state b(n) ← b(n−1)  b(n−1)i,∗ by broadcasting b
(n−1)
i,∗ .
Set n← n+ 1.
end while
in the set excluding player i. Hence, b = (bi,b−i) is the joint strategy of all players.
ui(bi,b−i), the utility of player i, is defined as (4.8). ui(bi,b−i) is the function of
potential interference generated and experienced by player i. The strategy state b(n) is
the joint strategy of all players b at the n-th step. A-ATG is also operated by sequential
best-response dynamics. The strategy state is updated by b(n) ← b(n−1)  b(n−1)i,∗
which means that b(n) is updated by substituting the i-th element of b(n−1) to b(n−1)i,∗ =
argmaxbi [Ui(b
(n−1))]. Similar to ATG, A-ATG is also an exact potential game, and
therefore guarantees the existence of the NE, which is denoted by b∗. The following
theorem is established.




Proof : The progress of proof of Theorem 2 is equivalently adopted into Theorem
3, with conversion Ui(s) to ui(b).
Although A-ATG might have lower performance in terms of interference mini-
mization and power saving than ATG, it has a significant advantage in reducing com-
putational complexity and signaling overhead as shown in Table 4.1. The computa-
tional complexity for searching a global optimal value is O(2M × K). However, the
suboptimal solutions with ATG and A-ATG are solved in polynomial time. Compu-
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tational complexity of ATG and A-ATG are O(KMN) and O(MN), respectively,
where N is an averaged number of each player’s strategy update to converge to the
NE. The number of steps to converge to the NE, MN , is bounded to M2 [72], and the
computational complexities to obtain the best response strategy at each step are O(K)
andO(1). The effect of reduction of 1/K is also shown in terms of signaling overhead.
Term K(M − 1) in the ATG case and term (M − 1) in A-ATG case means that every
opponent sends player i’s suffering actual (ATG) and potential (A-ATG) interference
to player i for calculating the utility function of player i. BCSI is the resolution for
sending CSI and is typically 4-5 bits per one subchannel. Term “4” in Table 4.1 means
that information of source-to-relay, source-to-destination, relay-to-relay and relay-to-
destination interference links are necessary. The steps of the algorithm for A-ATG are
summarized in Algorithm 4.4.
4.4 Simulation Results
4.4.1 Parameters Settings
In this section, I evaluate the performance of my proposed algorithms. Ten commu-
nication sessions are assumed, and every node is randomly distributed within a circle
of a network site, as depicted in Figure 4.3. The source, relay, and destination nodes
are denoted by circles, triangles, and stars, respectively. I assume that all source and
relay nodes have a 23 dBm transmit power constraint and a 5 MHz system bandwidth
with six subchannels. The thermal noise power is assumed to be -174 dBm/MHz. The
path loss gain is given as 128.15 + 37.6log(da,b) in decibels, where da,b is the distance
between the nodes a and b measured in kilometers. Each location’s shadowing value
should be calculated with a geometric grid on the basis of the standard deviation of the
shadowing and the decorrelated distance with an appropriate spatial correlation [73].
The standard deviation of the shadowing is 8 dB, and the decorrelated distance is 50
m. A small-scale fading channel is generated by Jake’s simulator by assuming a car-
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Figure 4.3: Graphical representation of the locations of the communication sessions.
rier frequency of 2 GHz, and a user’s random walk velocity is 3 km/h. A transmit time
interval of 1 ms is assumed.
4.4.2 Network Interference in One-shot Game
I set the SA algorithm in [39, 40] as the baseline to assess my proposed algorithms in
terms of network interference.1 The SA algorithm (also called an interference mini-
mization game) in [39, 40] was introduced as a decentralized solution for minimizing
the network interference with a low complexity in wireless ad-hoc networks with a
dense geometry. In SA, each communication session is allowed to have a fixed num-
1Actually, SA is focused on wireless ad-hoc networks consisting of one-hop links in [39,40]. However,
SA can be also directly used in wireless ad-hoc networks consisting of the two-hop links by the proper
conversion of utility function of SA.
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Opt. of P1 (with SA)
Figure 4.4: Trend of network interference with M = 10.
ber of subchannels Ki, where 1 < Ki ≤ K . In addition, I set Ki = 5 for all i. The
predetermination ofKi is to resolve the limitation of SA, in which communication ses-
sions select any subchannel to avoid interference, which is also mentioned in [39, 40].
All players belong to Ck0 at the initial state, i.e., the information of Ik(Rj , Ri) and
Ik(Sj , Di) for all i, j, k, which are related to ATG or A-ATG, is not of concern in the






k(Sj , Ri) + I
k(Rj , Di) + I
k(Si, Rj) + I
k(Ri, Dj)],
which represents the sum of the total interference that the corresponding player re-
ceives from the environment and the total interference generated by the player that
is contributed to the environment. I also set the period for operating SA to 20 steps,
which is sufficient to find the solution of SA. Without SA scenarios, i.e., the case of




Figure 4.5: Individual power consumption for satisfying rate demand (= 6 Mbps) (a)
without SA and (b) with SA.
64
SA scenarios, i.e., the case of Ki = 5, ATG and A-ATG start operation at the 21st
step, which is after the period in which the SA solution is obtained. I set equal power
allocation to the subchannels Ki in this subsection.
The trend of the resulting network interferences proceed along their distributed
steps are shown in Figure 4.4. As the results show, cooperation between SA and my
proposed schemes shows high synergistic effects by virtue of the extended degree of
freedom by adding the temporal diversity of ATG or A-ATG to the spectral diversity
of SA. ATG achieves 89.7% and 90.0% of the optimal values without SA (dashed
line) and with SA (solid line), respectively, in terms of amount of network interfer-
ence reduction, (A-ATG: 84.8% and 85.7%). In addition, the performance gain of co-
operation between SA and ATG (or A-ATG) over only SA are 70.3% (67.0%). The
most interesting feature of Figure 4.4 is that network interference is drastically re-
duced at the third step. This feature is also shown in Figure 4.2 as the increase of
the network potential function at the third step. The actions of C3 and C10 drastically
contribute to reduce the network interference (and the network potential function in
Figure 4.2) as shown in Figure 4.4. This is because the geometric locations of C3 and
C10 are very close, and this severe geometric proximity causes strong interference for
each other. However, in my proposed schemes, C3 intelligently avoids the interference
generated and experienced for C10 by virtue of the degree of freedom based on tem-
poral diversity. While operating ATG, C3 selects its strategy as s3 = [111111] (i.e.,
implement one time slot backoff in all subchannels) to minimize the interference re-
lated to C10. Although any two players are geometrically close to each other, one of
these two players does not always select the perfect asymmetric transmission strat-
egy such as [111111]. However, Ik(S3, R10) and Ik(S10, R3) would be dominantly
large in the situation where S3 and S10 are very close and D3 and D10 are relatively
far. Thus, Ik(S3, R10) + Ik(S10, R3) + Ik(R3, D10) + Ik(R10, D3) would be larger
than Ik(R3, R10) + Ik(R10, R3) + Ik(S3, D10) + Ik(S10, D3), for C3, which selects
the best-response strategy earlier than C10 by the round-robin rule, and would select
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s3 = [111111]. After that, C10 naturally selects s10 = [000000] at its turn of play.
Likewise, the trend in the network interference is drastically reduced at the turn of C3
(i.e., at the 23rd step) while operating ATG and A-ATG after SA algorithm is finished.
From the viewpoint of A-ATG, NE is achieved right after updating the strategy of C3,
(i.e., every player excluding C3 satisfies the current state and does not update their
strategies), even though network interference has more chances to be reduced. This is
caused by the fact that the information of the network interference of each subchannel
is blinded from the viewpoint of A-ATG. However, in ATG, the network interference
is monotonically decreasing according to the updates of the strategies of the rest of
the players as well as C3 by virtue of the specific information related to the network
interference. In particular, the network interference is drastically reduced at the turn of
C10 (i.e., at the 30th step), which is not observed at the corresponding turn of C10 in
ATG without SA (at the 10th step). Because, in the “without SA” scenario, the entire
set of subchannels is used by C3 and C10 naturally. Thus, C3 and C10 do not select
the same state of transmission for all subchannels k. As a result, C3 and C10 select
their strategies as s3 = [111111] and s10 = [000000], respectively, in the “without
SA” scenario. However, in the “with SA” scenario, C3 and C10 select different sets of
subchannels to eliminate the subchannel that has the most crucial interference through
the sequential updates for SA operation. As a result, the dominant influences between
C3 and C10 should be relaxed; consequently, at the 30th step, C10 would have an addi-
tional chance to reduce the network interference related to the other players as well as
C3 on the basis of the differently selected sets of subchannels at each communication
session.
4.4.3 Individual Power Consumption in One-shot Game
Although the proposed ATG and A-ATG lead to less network interference in multiuser
ad-hoc HDR systems, they are also beneficial for individual power consumption for
satisfying rate demand. I compared the performance of the WF algorithm combined
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Sum of energy consumption (source nodes)
Sum of energy consumption (relay nodes)
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Sum of energy consumption (source nodes)
Sum of energy consumption (relay nodes)
(b)
Figure 4.6: Total energy consumption per minute with M = 10 (a) without SA and (b)
with SA.
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with ATG and A-ATG (termed “ATG + WF” and “A-ATG + WF”) to the WF algo-
rithm alone and the joint SA and WF (termed “SA + WF”). Let r̄ and ri as the data
rate requirement of all communication sessions and the achievable rate of communica-
tion session Ci, respectively. I set that r̄ is equal to 6 Mbps. ri is computed according





2min[log2(1 + γi,1), log2(1 + γi,2)], where γi,1 and γi,2 is the
SNIR at 1st time slot and 2nd time slot, respectively. WF optimizes the power allo-
cation using the power constraint under six subchannels and five subchannels for the
scenarios without and with SA, respectively. As I mentioned in Section 4.2, C3 and C10
are closely adjacent. In Figure 4.5, they need to consume more power to overcome the
large interference using only the WF algorithm. Ironically, they are the greatest ben-
eficiaries of my proposed schemes by virtue of the facts that they are isolated to only
two of them, and the selection of the best response strategy can be observed clearly,
as I mentioned in Section 4.2. As shown in the comparison of Figure 4.5(a) and Fig-
ure 4.5(b), the SA algorithm cannot lead to a reduction in the power consumption of C3
and C10. However, ATG and A-ATG show effective power savings for C3 and C10 by
virtue of the degree of freedom based on the temporal diversity. Another aspect of the
need for a high power consumption is shown for C8. It is surrounded by other players
(especially C2, C5, and C9) at a near distance; therefore, they experience interference
owing to the neighboring players. In Figure 4.5, the power consumption of C8 also
shows that my proposed schemes do not always guarantee effective power savings for
each player because ATG and A-ATG aim to optimize in terms of the global satisfac-
tion as the exact potential game. On the other hand, C4, C6, C7, and C9 generated and
experienced a small amount of network interference because they are located far from
the other players. Consequently, they need a small amount of power with any scheme
to achieve the rate demand in every scheme in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.7: Computation load for varying (a) K (M is set to 10) and (b) M (K is set
to 6).
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4.4.4 Total Energy Consumption in 1000-shot Games
In addition to looking at one particular instance of ATG and A-ATG, I also analyze
the energy consumption by simulating ATG and A-ATG over a long time duration. I
considered 1000 replications of one-shot ATG and A-ATG, during which most of my
global parameter settings were the same as before, except that the players’ locations
and channel conditions were randomly generated following the previously described
distribution. (As Figure 4.6 shows, I additionally plotted a direct link (a source-to-
destination link (termed “S-D direct”) scenario to show that only changing the S-D
direct link to a two-hop link with a relay node leads to significant energy savings. The
performance gain of the addition of relay nodes might depend on a relay selection al-
gorithm that is excluded in my approach. I consider it as future work to evaluate my
algorithms.) In Figure 4.6, I can see that “ATG+WF” and “A-ATG+WF” show higher
performance compared to the WF algorithm in terms of reducing the energy consump-
tion in the scenarios without and with SA. Naturally, “SA+ATG+WF” in Figure 4.6(b)
shows that the best performance in terms of the sum of the energy consumption of all
source nodes and all relay nodes per minute is 24.4 mJ and 24.8 mJ without and with
SA, respectively. More concretely, ATG attains gains of 17.4% and 9.8% over the WF
algorithm in the scenarios without and with SA, respectively. A-ATG also leads to re-
ductions in the total energy consumption per minute by 5.6% and 1.0% in the scenarios
without and with SA, respectively. I can verify that my proposed schemes show a bet-
ter performance gain over the WF algorithm in the scenario without SA than that with
SA. This effect originates from the difference in the subchannels used Ki. ATG and
A-ATG would miss opportunities to coordinate network interference because the num-
ber of co-used channels in network is naturally reduced after the SA algorithm is done.
In Figure 4.6(a), six subchannels are used for every communication session; thus, my
proposed schemes have many chances to demonstrate their potential ability. However,
in Figure 4.6(b), each communication session utilizes five subchannels, even in dif-
ferent subchannel elements. The elements of the correspondingly utilized subchannels
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are reduced in the scenario with SA; thus, the effectiveness of the proposed schemes
would be weaker.
4.4.5 Complexity Analysis for Varying K and M
Figure 4.7(a) and Figure 4.7(b) show the complexity analysis in terms of the num-
ber of flops when varying the numbers of subchannels and communication sessions,
respectively. A flop is defined as a real floating point operation. The computational
complexity of an operation is counted as the total number flops required for calculat-
ing the utility function, choosing the best response, and counting the total number of
iterations, and this method is applied to both the baseline algorithms and my proposed
algorithms. Recall that K and M denote the numbers of subchannels and communi-
cation sessions, respectively; then, the number of flops can be calculated as follows
(where I(•) is the averaged iteration number per communication session of the cor-
responding algorithm, and it is commonly close to 2, which is obtained from 1000
replications of the simulation, regardless of the algorithm):
•WF: (2K2 + 6K)MIWF (calculated by referring to [66, 74]).
•WF+ATG: (2K2 + 6K)MIWF + (2(M − 2) + 1)(2K)MIATG.
•WF+A-ATG:
(2K2 + 6K)MIWF + ((2(M − 2) + 1)(K − 1) + 1)(2)MIA-ATG.
• SA: 2((K − 1)(M − 2) + 1) K!Ki!(K−Ki)!MISA (calculated by referring to [39]).











As shown in the above equations, the increase in K greatly influences the required
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numbers of flops of WF and SA compared to those of ATG and A-ATG. In Fig-
ure 4.7(a), for simplicity, I set Ki to K − 1 for varying the number of subchannels.
However, this heuristic setting is reasonable when considering the complexity of SA
because of the combinatorial term K!Ki!(K−Ki)! , which is the required number of choos-
ing the best response in SA operation. Moreover, the lack of subchannels used may re-
sult in more power consumption in spite of the SA operation; thus, a sufficiently high
value for Ki should be set to attain a synergetic effect between SA and WF. When
adding ATG to “SA+WF”, the required number of flops of “SA+WF” is increased by
27% on average for all of the scenarios in Figure 4.7(a). From Figure 4.7(a), it is inter-
esting that the increase in the required number of flops owing to ATG is not very high
in spite of |Si| (or |Si(Ki)| (or |Si(Ki)|), which is 2K (or 2Ki). This is the reason why
finding the best response of ATG does not need a brute-force search of |Si|, which is
also described in the above equations. The determinations of si,k and si,k′ , which are
the elements of the best response, do not affect each other by virtue of the spectrum
orthogonality; thus, parallel and independent operation in the frequency domain is pos-
sible to find best response of ATG, which is attractive in comparison to SA because the
best response (choosing the best subchannels amongK) of SA should be combinatori-
ally determined by an exhaustive search. On the other hand, the complexity of A-ATG
is (1/K) of that of ATG from the viewpoint of the solution search space. However,
from the viewpoint of the number of flops, the computational load of A-ATG is not
(1/K) of that of ATG because A-ATG needs some subsidiary flops for an average
operation when calculating the utility function ui(b). In Figure 4.7(b), the influence of
adding ATG to “WF” or “SA+WF” becomes higher than that of the scenario in Fig-
ure 4.7(a) owing to the fact that the required number of flops of ATG increases on the
order of M2, in spite of just proportionally increasing with K in Figure 4.7(a). This
is the reason why both of the number of flops for calculating the utility function and
counting the total number of iterations are commonly proportional to M in the ATG
operation. Moreover, the number of flops for the A-ATG operation also increases in
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proportion to M2 for the same reason as ATG. However, in a WF operation, the num-
ber of flops for calculating the utility function does not depend on M ; consequently,
only the number of flops for counting the total number of iterations is proportional to
M . In addition, “ATG+WF” results in better performance with a reduction of 49% in
the required number of flops while maintaining the energy consumption performance
at a level similar to that of “SA+WF”. This effect on the reduction in the number of
flops should be more critical when Ki approaches K/2 owing to the term K!Ki!(K−Ki)!
in the equations containing the SA operation. In summary, the computational loads of
ATG and A-ATG in terms of the number of flops are more sensitive to M than K, and
the conversion of ATG to A-ATG in both “ATG+WF” and “SA+ATG+WF” leads an
reductions of 48% and 16%, respectively, in the required number of flops for the total




In this dissertation, by using supermodular game and exact potential game, I introduce
three algorithms, which are named as CRG, ASCG, and ATG, with considerations of
theoretical proof and practical issues in WSNs and wireless cellular networks.
First, I propose a game-theoretical power control based distributed algorithm, called
CRG, suitable for wireless localization in energy-limited WSNs. The solution of CRG,
which is obtained by the properties of supermodular game, results in the effective con-
nectivity for wireless localization with energy savings. I think that my proposed al-
gorithm can be effectively utilized in WSNs according to the system’s objective, e.g.,
energy consumption or quality of localization. Additionally, I believe that my contri-
bution can be more valuable in future WSNs when distribution of sensor nodes would
become denser.
Second, I propose the ASCG and ASCG-D, which are new coordinated-distributed
scheme that optimize GNI based ICIC problem. It is worth noting that ASCG-D re-
quires smaller signaling overhead and computational load for ICIC implementation
than the conventional dynamic ICIC schemes do and is robust with respect to the la-
tency of X2 interface. Moreover, ASCG-D is an exact potential game, so it has the
advantage of an NE solution always existing. Given that this study is conducted in a
homogeneous cellular network, further studies are required for a heterogeneous cel-
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lular network including femtocells, relay cells, and picocells. Moreover, my study is
expected to lead to interesting results when ASCG-D is combined with beamforming
problems in massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) cellular networks using
millimeter-wave technology.
Third, I introduce asymmetric transmission to reduce network interference in wire-
less multiuser ad-hoc networks with a two-hop relaying protocol. I formulate the asym-
metric transmission problems in HDR systems, and construct the game-theoretical al-
gorithm, called ATG, for deriving suboptimal solutions. The proposed algorithm guar-
antees the existence of the NE. Furthermore, I developed A-ATG based on the value of
spectral averaging in order to reduce signaling and computational complexity of ATG.
Compared with the conventional methods, the two algorithms show a significant de-
crease in network interference. For specific applications, I expect that the proposed
algorithms can be easily applied to the autonomous outband D2D communication
scenarios. With a proper change in game formulation, ATG and A-ATG can also be
utilized in more various scenarios, including the underlaying inband, overlaying in-
band, and controlled outband D2D communication scenarios, which are mixed with
an infrastructure system consisting a central entity (e.g., eNB) and cellular users. Sug-
gestions for further research include extending this work to multiuser ad-hoc network
with MIMO systems or multi-hop relaying protocol systems.
I deeply believe that these three algorithms can be highly potential solution for re-
solving the problems of limited resources in future wireless networks, such as Internet
of things (IoT), vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems, and D2D communications.
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Appendix A
Derivation of number of partitions for
extracting the dominant feasible
strategy set
If there exists a vector v = [a1, ..., aK ], where ak = |N l,k| for all k, how many v exist
that satisfy a1 + · · ·+ aK = N?
To solve this converted problem, integer ‘1’ must be added to each component ak.
Consequently, the final form of problem is as follows:
⇒ Let a vector V = [b1, ..., bK ] = [a1 + 1, ..., aK + 1]. Then, how many V exist
that satisfy b1+, ...,+BK = N + K? This is equivalent to selecting K − 1 elements
among N +K − 1 elements, as follows:
i) There are N +K − 1 holes.
ii) Insert K − 1 sticks into N + K − 1 holes, such that they are not overlapping.
In this case, two sticks are inserted into the first and second holes.
iii) In this case, the two sticks are inserted into the (N +K − 2)-th and the (N +
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K − 1)-th holes.
iv) In the first case, V = [1, 1, 26] and v = [0, 0, 25]. In the second case, V =
[26, 1, 1] and v = [25, 0, 0].








Derivation of the cardinal number of
the dominant feasible strategy set
Let T1 be the number of cases of possible N l,1D that satisfy the fixed cardinal number




. In the first iteration of choice, select arbitrary |N l,1D |
elements among N elements. Next, in the second iteration of choice, select arbitrary
|N l,2D | amongN−|N
l,1
D |, and notN . Hence, T2 . The total number of cases T is solved
as follows through iteration:




















Existence of NE in ASCG-D
For simplification, I omit the time index isuTsu. Let us separate the utility functions of
player l into the components of potential gain and potential interference (PGl(Yl) =
UPGl (Y











































Necessary condition (3.6) of an exact potential game is rewritten as
UPGl (Ỹ








Using (2), let us find FPG(Yl;YL−l) and FPI(Yl;YL−l) according to the compo-




i) Component UPGl (Yl)
UPGl (Y
l) in ASCG-D has the following two properties:
 UPGl (Y
l) is independent of YL−l .
 UPGl (Ỹl) = U
PG
l (Y
l) (∵ ∀Ỹl,Yl ∈ ℵlD).
Thus,
UPGl (Y
l) = FPG(Yl;YL−l) is constant. (3)
ii) Component UPIl (Y
l;YL−l)
















































Modified necessary condition (2) of an exact potential game will hold if I consider
































FPIn (Y ). (5)
FPIn (Y) is expressed as












= UPIl,n (Y) + o(Y
L−l). (6)
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n takes a constant value is independent of
Yl. It is dependent only on the strategies of other players with each other.
Suppose that player l change its strategy Yl to Ỹ l, wlin and w
jl






























l,m − µl,m), where ỹlnk is an
















l,n (Y ) + o(Y
L−l). (7)
By (6) and (7),UPIl,n (Ỹ
l;YL−l)−UPIl,n (Yl;YL−l) = FPIn (Ỹl;YL−l)−FPIn (Yl;YL−l).




l;YL−l)− FPIn (Yl;YL−l). (8)
From (3) and (8), then (2) will hold.
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Appendix D
The Required Signaling overhead of
ASCG-D
The signaling overhead per Tc is explained as follows (where BCSI , Bsu, and Bud are
defined in Section V., and N cm is the cardinal number of the candidate coloring RB set
of user m, whose value depends on the ICIC scheme):
 CSI based ICIC + FDPS :





















 FGC + FDPS :
Tc,de
Tc,de+Tc,period





 IMG + FDPS :






 Reuse-1 + FDPS : BCSI ·N ·M [bits/Tc].
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초록
본 박사 논문집에서는, 무선 센서 네트워크와 셀룰러 네트워크에서의 다양한
목표들을 해결하기 위해, 슈퍼모듈라 게임과 이그잭트 포텔셜 게임을 이용하여 세
가지 알고리즘들 (네트워크 연결 재정립 게임, 적응적 섹터 색칠 게임, 그리고 비














을 고려했을 때 채널 정보 기반 동적 셀간 간섭 조정 기법들 또한 효율적이라 보기





시스템 쓰루풋 측면에서 44.1%의 성능 향상을 보이며, 특히 하위 10% 사용자들의
경우 221%의 성능 향상을 보인다. 또한, 전체 그리고 하위 10% 사용자 쓰루풋 성
능에서의, 우세 전략 공간에서의 적응적 섹터 색칠 게임 대비 채널 정보 기반 동적
셀간간섭조정기법의이득은각각 13.0%와 5.6%로써,큰차이를보이지않는다.
가장 흥미로운 결과는 우세 전략 공간에서의 적응적 섹터 색칠 게임은 채널 정보




전송 기법을 제시한다. 비대칭적 신호 전송 기법은, 각 통신 세션 (소스-릴레이-데
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